Skip to main content

The Notion of Fit as a Mathematical Value

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Mathematical Cultures

Part of the book series: Trends in the History of Science ((TRENDSHISTORYSCIENCE))

Abstract

Many judgments are made about mathematical proofs, and among these we find the claim that a certain proof is beautiful or not. Beauty in mathematics is rarely denied, but it is also rarely explained. What is meant by the term, what criteria are needed for a proof to be beautiful, could there be objective qualities of a mathematical proof that map more or less onto the subjective experiences we might have when we read and understand it? While the concept of beauty itself is nebulous, the claim in this paper is that it might be related to a slightly more tractable quality of fit. We will discuss how fit arises in mathematics by looking at contrasting examples of proofs commonly held to be beautiful or not. We then take up the question about whether fit is a value, arguing that like justice and beauty, fit describes meaningful relationships and coherence, which make it a candidate for something to be valued not only in our mathematics classrooms, but also in the world at large.

The mathematician’s patterns, like the painter’s or the poet’s must be beautiful; the ideas, like the colours or the words, must fit together in a harmonious way.

G.H. Hardy.

This work was done in part at the Australian National University in Canberra.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    How does one know how a lilac tree should be shaped? Here we take some sort of assumption about its natural form—what the tree would look like if left to its own devices. It might be argued that this stance is subjective, that there could be several forms a lilac could take that are equally beautiful. This question of objectivity is tricky and will not be dealt with thoroughly here.

  2. 2.

    See Rota (1997) for an argument why mathematical beauty is objective. And see Beardsley (1958) for an argument why judgements of beauty, which might very well be subjective are not the same as beauty itself, which might very well be objective.

  3. 3.

    The proofs come from ongoing work done in collaboration with Lars-Daniel Öhman and a seminar on mathematical beauty held at Umeå University Fall 2011–Spring 2013. See (Raman and Öhman 2011, 2013) for further discussion of these examples.

  4. 4.

    See (Raman and Öhman 2011) for more discussion of this example.

  5. 5.

    The original proof is found in (Pick 1899). A short historical account is given at http://jsoles.myweb.uga.edu/history.html. Thanks to Bjorn Poonen for this example.

  6. 6.

    Leaving aside the question of whether the theory of natural selection is really a theory.

References

  • Aigner, M., & Ziegler, G. (2010). Proofs from the Book, 4edn. Berlin: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1958). Aesthetics: problems in the philosophy of criticism. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beardsley, M. C. (1982). The aesthetic point of view. Selected essays. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ernest, P. (this volume) (2016). Mathematics and Values.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferreirós, J. (this volume) (2016). Purity as a Value in the German-speaking area.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hardy, G. H. (1940). A Mathematician’s Apology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Hamming, R. W. (1980). The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics. The American Mathematical Monthly, 87(2), 81–90.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Hume, D. (1740). A treatise of human nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pick, G. (1899). Geometrisches zur Zahlenlehre. Sitzungsberichte des deutschen naturwissenschaftlich-medicinischen Vereines fŸr Bšhmen Lotos in Prag. (Neue Folge). 19, 311–319.

    Google Scholar 

  • Polya, G. (1954). Induction and analogy in mathematics, volume i of mathematics and plausible reasoning. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J. (2011). Emotion and Aesthetic Value. In E. Schellekens & P. Goldie (Eds.), The aesthetic mind: Philosophy and psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Raman, M., & Öhman, L.-D. (2011). Two beautiful proofs of Pick’s Theorem. In Proceedings of the Seventh Conference of European Research in Mathematics Education. Rzeszow, Poland. Feb. 9–13.

    Google Scholar 

  • Raman, M., & Öhman, L.-D. (2013). Beauty as fit: A metaphor in mathematics? Research in Mathematics Education 15(2), 199–200.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rota, G. C. (1997). Phenomenology of mathematical beauty. Synthese, 111(2), 171–182.

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Rolls, E. T. (2011). A neurobiological basis for affective feelings and aesthetics. In E. Schellekens & P. Goldie (Eds.), The aesthetic mind: philosophy and psychology (pp. 116–165). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Santayana, G. (1896). The sense of beauty. Charles Scribner’s Sons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scarry, E. (1999). On beauty and being just. Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schoenfeld, A. (2013). Classroom observations in theory and practice ZDM. Mathematics Education, 14, 607–621.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sinclair, N. (2002). The kissing triangles: The aesthetics of mathematical discovery. International Journal of Computers for Mathematical Learning, 7, 45–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sinclair, N. (2004). The roles of the aesthetic in mathematical inquiry. Mathematical Thinking and Learning, 6(3), 261–284.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steiner, M. (1978). Mathematical explanation. Philosophical Studies, 34, 135–151.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Tatarkiewicz, W. (1972). The great theory of beauty and its decline. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 31(2), 165–180.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Toronchuk, J. A., & Ellis, G. F. R. (2012). Affective neuronal Darwinism: The nature of the primary emotional systems. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 589.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vickers, G. (1978). Rationality and Intuition. In On Aesthetics and Science ed. Weschler: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weschler, J. (1978). On aesthetics in science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zimba, J. (2009). On the possibility of trigonometric proofs of the Pythagorean theorem. Forum Geometricorum, 9, 1–4.

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Manya Raman-Sundström .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Raman-Sundström, M. (2016). The Notion of Fit as a Mathematical Value. In: Larvor, B. (eds) Mathematical Cultures. Trends in the History of Science. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28582-5_16

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics