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The Effect of Risk Perceived Payoffs in Iterated Interdependent Security Games

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Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence (ACALCI 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 9592))

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Abstract

Interdependent security (IDS) refers to a class of problems that involve making security investment decisions under uncertainty arising from the interdependency between the actions of different decision making entities in the system. Such problems arise in many real world situations such as cyber, airline and homeland security and epidemics. IDS games provide a framework to study the behaviour of decision-makers in such environments. This paper presents a study of the IDS game dynamics in a simulation setting when the payoffs are varied based on different risk attitude functions using the concept of expected utilities. A special case of iterated IDS games is considered where the assumption of complete loss immunity, in the case where all agents cooperate in investing in their own security, is relaxed by introducing a small stochastic loss term in the payoff. The simulations are carried out using an evolutionary game-theoretic framework where strategies are evolved based on the payoffs accumulated over homogeneous iterated encounters. The results of the simulations suggest that the level of investments are reduced when agents take a risk-averse or risk-taking view of the game in comparison to risk-neutral view.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This decision tree does not represent a sequential game where the opponent takes its decision after knowing the decision of the player. We assume a simultaneous game.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Operations Research and Decision Support Department, Faculty of Computers and Information Cairo University, Post Box 12613, Giza, Egypt

    Ayman Ghoneim

  2. School of Engineering and Information Technology, University of New South Wales Canberra, Campbell, ACT, Australia

    Kamran Shafi

Authors
  1. Ayman Ghoneim
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  2. Kamran Shafi
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kamran Shafi .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Canberra, Aust Capital Terr, Australia

    Tapabrata Ray

  2. University of New South Wales, Canberra, Aust Capital Terr, Australia

    Ruhul Sarker

  3. RMIT University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

    Xiaodong Li

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Ghoneim, A., Shafi, K. (2016). The Effect of Risk Perceived Payoffs in Iterated Interdependent Security Games. In: Ray, T., Sarker, R., Li, X. (eds) Artificial Life and Computational Intelligence. ACALCI 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9592. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28270-1_29

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28270-1_29

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-28269-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-28270-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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