Modeling and Inferring in Science

  • Emiliano IppolitiEmail author
  • Thomas Nickles
  • Fabio Sterpetti
Part of the Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics book series (SAPERE, volume 25)


Science continually contributes new models and rethinks old ones. The way inferences are made is constantly being re-evaluated. The practice and achievements of science are both shaped by this process, so it is important to understand how models and inferences are made. But, despite the relevance of models and inference in scientific practice, these concepts still remain controversial in many respects. The attempt to understand the ways models and inferences are made basically opens two roads. The first one is to produce an analysis of the role that models and inferences play in science. The second one is to produce an analysis of the way models and inferences are constructed, especially in the light of what science tells us about our cognitive abilities. The papers collected in this volume go both ways.


Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder True Belief Scientific Practice Semantic View 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Emiliano Ippoliti
    • 1
    Email author
  • Thomas Nickles
    • 2
  • Fabio Sterpetti
    • 1
  1. 1.Sapienza University of RomeRomeItaly
  2. 2.University of NevadaRenoUSA

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