Abstract
Much of the philosophical debate about scientific models has focused on their representational function. Beginning with a discussion of the problem of scientific representation in general (as explored by Nelson Goodman, Bas van Fraassen, and others) this chapter discusses two specific proposals of how model-based representation comes about: first, R.I.G. Hughes’s ‘DDI account’, according to which the representational capacity of models is due to the interplay between denotation, demonstration, and interpretation; and second, Mauricio Suárez’s inferential account, which holds that whether or not a model represents its target is at least in part a matter of whether the former allows competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences about the latter. Both accounts reflect a growing recognition of the pragmatic dimension of model-based representation. The chapter closes with a discussion of the issue of realism in relation to models, and of possible non-representational uses of models.
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Notes
- 1.
Whereas in Languages of Art (1968/1976), Goodman offers no definition of the term 'denotation', in Of Mind and Other Matters (1984), he writes: ‘This common relationship of applying to or standing for, I call denotation—not to preclude but rather to introduce examination of various types of denotation in different symbol systems and also the relationships between denotation and other types of reference.’ [11, p. 80].
- 2.
For a defence of resemblance as the basis of representation, at least for the case of depiction, see [26].
- 3.
Similar to ‘non-reductionism’ about the representational relation, Suárez describes as ‘primitivism’ any position that ‘claims that the representational relation, if there is any, may not be further analysed’ [14, p. 94].
- 4.
Similarly, Uskali Mäki [28, pp. 12–13] notes that, in many cases, apparent falsehoods included in models are best interpreted as (true) claims about the neglibility of certain empirical factors.
- 5.
For example, Alisa Bokulich has argued that models that are false in virtue of being ‘fictionalized’—because they involve ‘fictional entities or processes that are not related to the true ones in the world by what might be thought of as a distortion or series of successive cases’ [27]—can nonetheless offer genuine scientific explanations.
- 6.
Against this conclusion, Mäki has argued that one should resist such talk of ‘performativity’: ‘If it happens that certain practices and arrangements and patterns in real world finance are in line with the Black-Scholes-Merton formula, this naturally does not mean that the theoretical formula or its uttering by […] academic scholars—or by practitioners in the world of finance—“performs” those practices’, because as he sees it, ‘there is no constitutive relationship here between the theoretical model and some empirical practices and patterns’ [29, p. 448].
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Gelfert, A. (2016). Scientific Representation and the Uses of Scientific Models. In: How to Do Science with Models. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27954-1_2
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