Abstract
What is at stake in philosophical debates on values is whether it is possible to accurately describe our moral, aesthetic, religious or otherwise evaluative experiences without entering an ontological commitment to values as independently existing objects that cannot be reduced to physical objects. As far as values emerge in Felix Kaufmann’s work this venerable debate is reduced to the question of how social scientists should deal with the fact/value dichotomy. The present essay aims at elaborating and challenging Kaufmann’s thoughts on values and their impact on his understanding of social reality. In order to approach this aim I introduce two methodological issues, called strata of experience and the philosopher’s fallacy, which offer a suitable framework for inquiring into Kaufmann’s Methodenlehre (1936), his Methodology (1944) and other relevant materials.
In accordance with his positivist leanings, Kaufmann maintains that any legitimate concern for values must restrict itself to analyzing value judgments as part of a scientific methodology. Contrary to this, I argue that subverting and bypassing descriptions of everyday evaluative (e.g. moral) experiences, including fine-grained analyses of their intentional structure, represents a serious deficiency of Kaufmann’s approach. The latter is brought to light by presenting Husserl’s phenomenological investigation of evaluative experiences which neither complies with the narrow range of a purely scientific treatment nor embarks on the opposite extreme of value Platonism. It is this rigid opposition that lurks behind Kaufmann’s relegation of values into the sphere of irrationality. Having contrasted Kaufmann’s and Husserl’s value inquiries, I conclude by taking stock of their implications. In doing so, I, first, try to figure out their overall understanding of social reality. Secondly, I ponder their presumable responses to current debates on entangling or disentangling views with regard to the fact/value dichotomy.
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Notes
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- 2.
- 3.
‘Semantic ascent’ indicates a shift from questions about objects (material mode of speech) to questions about how objects are linguistically represented and referred to (formal mode of speech).
- 4.
In the present context, I cannot dwell on Husserl’s axiological investigations which, according to their general outline, strongly approach Kaufmann’s style and direction of analysis. This is obvious, for instance, with regard to Husserl’s critique of Kant’s categorical imperative. See Rinofner-Kreidl 2010.
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- 6.
See below Sect. 14.3, on the idea of the phenomenological reduction.
- 7.
For instance, Kaufmann does not subscribe to the rigid idea of a unity-of-science program. He rather acknowledges a ‘Methodenpartikularismus’ as suitable and inevitable in the social sciences (Kaufmann 1936a, p. 221), although he also stresses the similarities between social sciences and (natural) sciences. As to Kaufmann’s intermediate position between positivism and phenomenology (cf. Huemer 2003), which marks out a moderate unity-of-science view (cf. Helling 1985, pp. 250 ff), it is instructive to take note of his remark “daß meine Arbeit nicht als phänomenologische Theorie der Sozialwissenschaften zu bezeichnen ist, obwohl die Werke des Begründers der transzendentalen Phänomenologie, des großen Philosophen EDMUND HUSSERL, meine Gedanken stark und nachhaltig beeinflußt haben. Denn die in diesem Buche durchgeführten methodologischen Analysen stehen noch diesseits der Problemstellung der transzendentalen Phänomenologie; ihr Ziel ist ‚Formalkritik‘, nicht ‚Transzendentalkritik‘, wenn man diese beiden Begriffe im Sinne HUSSERLS versteht.“(Kaufmann 1936a, p. III f [preface])
- 8.
As indicated above, the background assumptions of Kaufmann’s line of reasoning with regard to values in his ‘Methodenlehre’ already come to the fore in an earlier work, namely in the first chapter of his monograph ‘Die philosophischen Grundprobleme der Lehre von der Strafrechtsschuld’ (cf. Kaufmann 1929, pp. 5–28). The continuity of Kaufmann’s views on values from his early works until his latest is documented, for instance, in a very late article published in the year of Kaufmann’s death (1949) which is entitled ‘The Issue of Ethical Neutrality in Political Science’ (cf. Kaufmann 1949). For reasons of space I cannot dwell on these publications.
- 9.
- 10.
Cf. “Die Tauglichkeiten werden dann als unselbständige Werte aufgefaßt, wenn der Zweck, dem sie dienen, selbst deutlich ins Bewußtsein tritt; sie erscheinen aber als ‚selbständig’, ‚unbedingt’, ‚absolut’, sobald jener Zweck so fraglos ist, dass er unter die Bewußtseinsschwelle sinkt und als gedankliches Rudiment nur das Bewusstsein zurückbleibt, dass die positive Bewertung bestimmter anderer Sachverhalte (der Mittel) rational begründbar ist.” (Kaufmann 1929, p. 17)
- 11.
“When these criteria – the axiological rules and the procedural rules respectively – are made explicit, it is seen that the value judgment ‘A valuation of a given object is correct in terms of a presupposed system of axiological rules by virtue of the properties of the object’ has a form corresponding to that of the proposition ‘A scientific decision concerning a given proposition p is correct in terms of a given system of procedural rules on the basis of accepted propositions.’ Propositions of both kinds are analytic propositions.” (Kaufmann 1944, p. 235) Cf. ibid., pp. 132 f, 200, 208.
- 12.
Cf. Kaufmann 1944, p. 200.
- 13.
- 14.
For a detailed analysis of this presupposition see Rinofner-Kreidl 2015.
- 15.
He therefore does not distinguish between value experience, that is, the experience of values as objects and evaluative experiences, that is, the experience of valuable objects and states of affairs. Elaborating this distinction is vital to the alternative phenomenological approach I am going to present in the following.
- 16.
Kaufmann’s relating concern seems to strongly lie with the claim for immediacy which, according to his understanding, excludes any reference to implicit meaning components referring to previous activities of understanding or reflecting (cf. Kaufmann 1944, p. 133). As I am going to compare Kaufmann’s and Husserl’s approach to value analysis, it is fit to stress that Husserl’s phenomenological intuitionism does not confirm this idea of immediacy. It does not subscribe to the idea that grasping values by means of emotions should be understood in terms of a “rein passives Hinnehmen” (Kaufmann 1936a, p. 91). Cf. Rinofner-Kreidl 2014a. In the present context, it is the two-tiered analysis of value constitution that protests against the demand for simple givenness, that is, immediate experience of values. See below Sect. 14.3.
- 17.
This objection touches on another issue that seems to be troublesome. If we refer to given scientific rules in order to prove that certain statements are correct (and can be rightly integrated into a given scientific theory), this leaves open two alternatives: we may either acknowledge that these rules, on their part, are justified by some presupposed rules of higher order (cf. Kaufmann 1944, p. 205) and put up with an infinite regress of justification. Or we may admit of an ultimately conventional agreement on rules of scientific procedure. As far as I can see, Kaufmann, ultimately, sides with the second alternative.
- 18.
The same holds good with regard to truth. According to Kaufmann, truth must not be conceived either as a property of propositions or as a mere product of thinking. “An adequately formulated coherence theory of truth will not state that truth is created by and is thus dependent upon actual verification; it will rather state that the meaning of ‘truth’ is defined in terms of the rules of verification and invalidation. It is misleading to say that verification creates truth even if the terms ‘true proposition’ and ‘verified proposition’ are considered synonymous. Frequently, however, the term ‘true’ is not related to actual procedure but to possible procedure, and truth is understood as an ideal. We then mean by a ‘true’ proposition one that could be accepted if we had all knowledge relevant for the scientific decision concerning its acceptance and that, once accepted, could withstand all possible controls.” (Kaufmann 1944, pp. 231 f)
- 19.
It is with a view to such taken-for-granted conceptions of science and philosophy that Putnam utters: “The worst thing about the fact/value dichotomy is that in practice it functions as a discussion-stopper, and not just a discussion-stopper, but a thought-stopper.” (Putnam 2002, p. 44)
- 20.
Cf. “… the logical positivists did not regard ethics as a possible subject of rational discussion. Indeed, their fact/value dichotomy was not based on any serious examination of the nature of values or valuation at all; what they examined – and in a narrow empiricist spirit – was the nature of ‘fact’.” (Putnam 2002, p. 29)
- 21.
For a detailed explanation of the concept of foundation see Rinofner-Kreidl 2013.
- 22.
Cf. “The epoché […] is meant primarily to block the impulse to explain intentionality in naturalistic terms, thereby allowing one to focus on it in its intuitive self-givenness as justifying reasons for phenomenological descriptions.” (Crowell 2007, p. 143 f)
- 23.
In a similar way, Husserl explains the phenomenological approach in his Ideas I with a view to all possible types of acts. Phenomenological analysis is bound to a reflective stance which results in a hitherto unknown qualification of our talk about ‘being’. This is due to the fact that positing natural objects is to be distinguished from positing intentional objects within the immanent sphere of pure consciousness. Cf. Husserl 1983, § 50 (“Umkehrung der Seinrede”); Rinofner-Kreidl 2000, pp. 686–699.
- 24.
Taking up a suitable suggestion of an anonymous reviewer one may state the relevant distinction as follows: The first order affective experience is directed towards the individualized value (the value qua moment of the object), whereas the second order act tracks the value qua property. A two-level analysis of evaluative acts as presented above may be found in John Drummond’s works too, who, among others, refers to the issue of the particular-dependent being of a universal (here: a universal value), according to Husserl, in order to argue in favour of the thesis that we have to distinguish the experience of the valuable particulars from the grasping of the corresponding value. Cf. Drummond 2006, p. 12.
- 25.
The crucial point, however, is that a phenomenological analysis of value constitution leaves room for shared (social) processes of meaning interpretation. See below Sect. 14.4. For an extensive treatment of the Humpty-Dumpty objection against a phenomenological analysis of meaning see Rinofner-Kreidl 2003, pp. 68–89.
- 26.
Accordingly, Husserlian-style phenomenologists wholeheartedly agree with Putnam’s statement that “there is no reason to suppose that one cannot be what is called a ‘moral realist’ in meta-ethics, that is, hold that some ‘value judgments’ are true as a matter of objective fact, without holding that moral facts are or can be recognition [of] transcendent facts. If something is a good solution to a problematic human situation, then part of the very notion of its being a good solution is that human beings can recognize that it is. We need not entertain the idea that something could be a good solution although human beings are in principle unable to recognize that it is. That sort of rampant Platonism is incoherent.” (Putnam 2002, p. 108 f)
- 27.
The present approach does not entail the thesis (which I consider wrong) that affective responses, as well as instances of perceptual givenness, should be considered to ‘truly’ or ‘ultimately’ harbour a judgmental structure. Following Husserl, we should rather argue that it is essential for such phenomena to be amenable to expressions in terms of corresponding judgments. In the present context, I cannot dwell on explaining and defending Husserl’s assumption of an analogous functioning of reason (cf. Rinofner-Kreidl 2013). Yet I take it that it is misguided to approach this assumption by maintaining that we either succeed in making plausible the thesis of an ‘ultimately’ judgmental structure of affective responses or have to consider the analogous functioning of reason an entirely arbitrary theoretical postulate. The relevant intentional phenomena comprise active and passive, implicit and explicit, object-directed and horizontal functions of attention. Deciding the issue therefore requires taking note of the relating complexities.
- 28.
Hence Kaufmann’s uncompromising statement to the effect that “diese Werte sind nirgends ausweisbar” (Kaufmann 1929, p. 12) is due to his failure to inquire into the variety of different modes of givenness.
- 29.
To be sure, Husserl is also concerned with an axiological theory (cf. Husserl 1988, pp. 70–101). Yet he does not exclude the sphere of passive intentionality which goes beyond this specific theoretical project. This is obvious especially with regard to his later lectures and research manuscripts on ethical issues. Cf. Husserl 2004. As to Husserl’s and Kaufmann’s axiology and their connection with normative reasons for acting, I cannot discuss any details here. Among the similarities is that both try to do justice to individual differences and do so in a generalizable mode (‘disinterested observer’). In this connection, Husserl refers to so-called ‘practical possibilities’ (cf. Husserl 1988, p. 149). Kaufmann mentions ‚Persönlichkeitsziele‘, ‚Glücksziele‘ and ‚ästhetische Ziele‘ as basic types of purposes when introducing the task of an axiology as follows: it is meant to devise “ein Schema von Wertungstypen […], welches einerseits Grundtypen der letzten Ziele, und andererseits die Hauptlinien der empirischen Verknüpfungen von Wertungen zu enthalten hätte.“(Kaufmann 1936a, p. 193)
- 30.
See for instance the juxtaposition of predicative and pre-predicative experience in Kaufmann 1936a, pp. 123 f where he associates this distinction with different grades of clarity and distinctness. Hence the pre-predicative sphere is said to represent “muddled (non-explicit) thought” (“verworrenes (unexpliziertes) Denken”) (ibid., p. 15).
- 31.
See the final chapter XVII (‘Summary and Conclusions’) in Kaufmann 1944 where he succinctly presents his ideas on the logic of science.
- 32.
- 33.
The same does not hold for Husserl who never committed himself to a positivist idea of rational science. In particular, the later Husserl (after Ideas I) is strongly interested in the constitution of (moral) persons and of personal communities, thereby considering different forms and levels of higher-order personalities. The latter are conceived as multi-layered intentional unities whose occurrence requires lower-level intentional activities of individual agents who (tacitly or explicitly) commit themselves to some kind of shared project. See e.g. Husserl 2008, pp. 527 ff, where Husserl refers to “generative Lebensgemeinschaften als Willensgemeinschaften höherer Stufe“.
- 34.
Given this peculiar relation of representation, it should be clear that the rights and obligations of juridical persons must not be conceived as the outcome of a process of summing up the rights and obligations of individual persons. For a more detailed and precise conceptual analysis of juridical persons see Kaufmann 1966, pp. 90–97.
- 35.
In a similar vein, Kaufmann may argue that, given the above account of societies as law-guided functional wholes, we do not fall back on psychologism when endorsing anti-Platonism. We can both advocate anti-Platonism and anti-psychologism if we take the point of view of laws and abstain from interpreting invariances in terms of independent entities, “die in den Sozialwissenschaften als Mißdeutung der Anonymität in Transpersonalität auftritt.” (Kaufmann 1930, p. 306) See also “die Unzulässigkeit der Umdeutung anonymer interindividueller Beziehungen in supraindividuelle Wesenheiten, in einen ‘objektiven Geist’“(ibid.). Cf. Kaufmann 1944, p. 163. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer whose comments helped me to realize the necessity to be more explicit on Kaufmann’s refraining from a contemporary project of social ontology and on the outstanding role which applications of laws play for his understanding of social groups, institutions, and societies.
- 36.
Cf.: “To say that a society of a particular kind exists at a certain place and time means that there exists a field of application for a scheme of interpretation [which explains human actions in terms of presupposed motives of the actors, thereby referring to laws in light of which the prediction is warranted, SR]. It is to this scheme what an electric field is to the laws of electrodynamics. To say that a society arises or disappears is to say that such a field of application arises or disappears. The same holds of states, legal orders, languages, and institutions of all kinds.” (Kaufmann 1944, pp. 161 f)
- 37.
“Diese Gesetze sind aber nicht etwas, was ‚über’ oder ‚vor’ den einzelnen Menschen wäre; sondern es sind typische Beziehungen, die gegenüber individuellen Variationen innerhalb gewisser Grenzen invariant bleiben.” (Kaufmann 1930, p. 299)
- 38.
Abstaining from incorrigibility, on the one hand, parallels with abstaining from an overall (global) sceptical stance which questions all and every givenness, on the other. Of course, these tendencies are interrelated with one another.
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Rinofner-Kreidl, S. (2016). Disenchanting the Fact/Value Dichotomy: A Critique of Felix Kaufmann’s Views on Value and Social Reality. In: Salice, A., Schmid, B. (eds) The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27692-2_14
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