Abstract
The chapter explores the topic of experiential sharing by drawing on the early contributions of the phenomenologists Alfred Schutz and Gerda Walther. It is argued that both Schutz and Walther support, from complementary perspectives, an approach to experiential sharing that has tended to be overlooked in current debates. This approach highlights specific experiential interrelations taking place among individuals who are jointly engaged and located in a common environment, and situates this type of sharing within a broader and richer spectrum of sharing phenomena. Whereas Schutz’ route to the sharing of experiences describes the latter as a pre-reflective interlocking of individual streams of experiences, arising from a reciprocal Thou-orientation, Walther provides a textured account of different types of sharing and correlated forms of communities.
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Notes
- 1.
In the analytic philosophical tradition, the expression “shared intention” was introduced by Bratman (cf. Gilbert 2014, 97). Here it is used as neutral with respect to the different accounts.
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The English translations of passages from Schutz’s book have throughout been modified where necessary, in order to provide a more accurate rendering of the original.
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Walther makes reference here, amongst others, to Husserl, who is also one of the key sources of Schutz’s book, in particular of the latter’s concept of Du-Einstellung (cf. Schutz 1967, 101). As for the topic of Einfühlung, Walther refers to Stein’s Zum Problem der Einfühlung, and to the Anhang of Scheler’s Phänomenologie der Sympathiegefühle (later made part of his Wesen und Formen der Sympathie as the last section of the last part of the book. Cf. Schlossberger 2005, 148).
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A somewhat similar account can also be found in Husserl. Consider for instance the following quote from 1922: “An act, in which an I is directed to another, is founded first of all on the following: I1 empathically apprehends I2, and vice-versa, but not only this. I1 experiences (understands) I2 as understandingly experiencing [verstehend Erfahrenden], and vice-versa. I see the other as an other that sees me and understands me. Furthermore, I ‘know’ that the other also knows that he is seen by me. We understand each other, and in the mutual understanding we are spiritually together, in contact” (Husserl 1973, 211).
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León, F., Zahavi, D. (2016). Phenomenology of Experiential Sharing: The Contribution of Schutz and Walther. In: Salice, A., Schmid, B. (eds) The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 6. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27692-2_10
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