Abstract
Children have a fine sense of injustice. But can they report their experiences? Are their voices heard? This essay criticizes conceptions of justice that focus merely on the offender, and, thus, dismiss the experiences of the affected. In order to discuss children’s life, it is necessary to include their experiences and perspectives, and to give them their own voice. By addressing ethical and epistemic injustice, this approach enfolds the sense of injustice itself, it poses the question of how to describe injustice as a phenomenon on its own, and depicts prejudices caused by ageism, racism, or sexism that may exclude the testimony of particular persons, for instance children. Children belong to the group that is particularly vulnerable to being affected by ethical and epistemic injustice because their testimony is dismissed quite easily. They are born into and live in relations, they did not choose. Based on these relations children experience the surrounding world, they feel trust or mistrust, and they face injustice or justice towards themselves or others. Ethical and epistemic injustices violate the children’s well-being.
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Notes
- 1.
The 3. World Vision children’s report by Andresen and Hurrelmann (2013) focuses on Germany. However, for the purposes of this essay I take this empirical study as evidence of children’s interests and views around the world.
- 2.
Andresen and Hurrelmann (2013: 26).
- 3.
Andresen and Hurrelmann (2013: 46).
- 4.
- 5.
Andresen and Hurrelmann (2013: 48).
- 6.
In this paper, I will not discuss questions of justice and agency in general. In addition, I will not be concerned with the question who or which institutions are responsible for injustice or justice. These questions are very interesting. However, my focus will be on the question of how to detect and report injustice. This question includes the concern that a child’s testimony should not be dismissed because it is given by a child.
- 7.
The argument of this paper will not include the question of whether or not children should be heard on their interests and wishes. Thus, here I do not discuss how children may participate in decision making processes. For the discussion how children should be heard in regard to choices that concern them, see Brighouse (2003). Distinct from children’s participation in decision-making is listening to children concerning reports about situations or incidents in reality. Here a concern is rather whether a report is true or correct and whether it corresponds with what ‘really’ happened.
- 8.
Ricœur (1992: 198).
- 9.
Here I agree with Judith Shklar (1990: 29).
- 10.
In addition: Plato’s conception of the states is found in analogy to the soul.
- 11.
Plato (book I).
- 12.
Plato (book I).
- 13.
Shklar (1990).
- 14.
Different normative theories have also addressed the issue of injustice. Examples are theories of recognition, such as for instance by Axel Honneth (1995) and the capability approach of Amartya Sen (2009) and Martha Nussbaum (2013). They are all very important approaches. However, I limit this paper to a line of thinking that can be used in discussing the credibility of reports about injustice.
- 15.
Shklar writes: “The fear we fear is of pain inflicted by others to kill and maim us, not the natural and healthy fear that merely warns us of avoidable pain. And, when we think politically, we are afraid not only for ourselves but for our fellow citizens as well. We fear a society of fearful people.” (1989: 29).
- 16.
Shklar (1990, 1f.).
- 17.
Schweiger and Graf (2014) discuss the relation between an objective and subjective experience of injustice. There are specific problems of evaluating the experience of injustice in the case which does not involve injustice and the case of injustice which does not accord with an experience by the affected person. There is also some literature on “adaptive preferences” and the question whether it is to be regarded as a deficiency in rationality (Khader 2009). To follow up this line of argument would expand this paper into discussions about capability approaches and further aspects of how to take injustice as being “normal”.
- 18.
The notion of family is used here in a very broad sense. It refers to the persons with whom a child spends most time and who cares for him or her. In his chapter “The morality of authority”, John Rawls describes that family is important for the child’s development of a sense of right and justice (Rawls 1971: 462–479).
- 19.
Munoz-Dardé (2002): 255, also fn.).
- 20.
- 21.
Schües (2015).
- 22.
See more arguments about the normative content of well-being and its relational structure in Schües and C. Rehmann-Sutter (2013: 32).
- 23.
Giesinger (2013: 1–15).
- 24.
It might be argued that is not only the question whether children should be heard but more importantly how they can be heard. The article by Brighouse, discusses this question: How should children be heard?, (2003). However, in this interesting article, Brighouse focuses merely on how children can be heard concerning their interests and wishes. He discusses the rights of children and their dependency on adults to negotiate their interests, wishes, and activities in life. The criteria of decision-making by the adult focus on the question: “What is good for the child?” Hearing a child’s testimony is different: Certainly the child’s voice has to be interpreted, but the criteria for judgments are found in the facts and merits of a reported case of injustice. To believe a witness means to have a description of a case and, perhaps, to investigate into further details about the case. Such further investigation might or might not involve further testimonies.
- 25.
Fricker (2007: 1).
- 26.
Carel and Györffy (2014) wrote a rather short follow-up of Fricker’s paper concerning children within the health care system.
- 27.
Fricker (2007: 55).
- 28.
- 29.
Ricœur (2008 : 10ff.).
- 30.
I like to thank Paul Lauer, and the editors of this volume for their very helpful comments.
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Schües, C. (2016). Epistemic Injustice and Children’s Well-Being. In: Drerup, J., Graf, G., Schickhardt, C., Schweiger, G. (eds) Justice, Education and the Politics of Childhood. Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27389-1_10
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