Abstract
This chapter introduces and motivates the overall project of the book: to show how a great deal of Husserl’s theory of “world-constitution” can be unified using a relatively compact formalism.
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- 1.
Prominent examples are his apparent shift from realism to idealism, and his changing attitude towards the transcendental ego. Both changes are believed to have occurred after the publication of the first edition of the Logical Investigations (in 1901). The shift to idealism is controversial (see, e.g. [104]), but the changing status of the ego is marked by Husserl himself, who initially says he was “quite unable to find this ego” but later notes (in the second edition of the Logical Investigations, published in 1913), “I have since managed to find it.”
- 2.
Most of the substantive claims that follow can be thought of as consequents of an implicit conditional that begins “given a stable cognizer in a stable environment....” This is explicit in the statement of the two main rules in Chap. 3. The point of this condition is to preclude certain logically possible situations in which the relevant dynamical patterns could be violated. If we allow arbitrarily degenerate environments or forms of cognition, then, as Husserl himself notes, various kinds of “chaos” can result, i.e. processes that are subjective but insufficient to present an agent with a coherent sense of an independently existing reality. I use the phrase “stable cognizer in a stable environment” (or just “stable cognizer”) to designate an agent whose experiences over time are coherent enough for a stable world to appear. It is interesting to consider what specific constraints are involved in being a stable cognizer: two specific constraints are discussed in Chap. 3, but there are surely others as well. There is additional discussion in [113], but there is further work to be done understanding how the dynamical rules formalized here are related to the Husserlian/Kantian transcendental project.
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Yoshimi, J. (2016). Introduction. In: Husserlian Phenomenology. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26698-5_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26698-5_1
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