Abstract
Defining and documenting the hazards which pertain to a particular Health IT solution is a fundamental part of a safety analysis. The content generated forms the basis of the safety argument, essentially it is the raw data on which the rest of the safety case will be built. Only by having a rigorous method in place is it possible to ensure that key hazards and causes are captured. A disorganised approach quickly brings into question the completeness and rigour of the exercise. A number of formal methods have emerged from the safety engineering domain. Sadly Health IT’s complexity, configurability and dependence on human factors means that many are difficult to apply and no single technique works across the board. Methods which employ collaborative brainstorming and multidisciplinary expertise have found to be useful in safety assessing Health IT. This chapter investigates how the Structured What-If Technique and other methods can be valuable in creating the hazard register.
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Stavert-Dobson, A. (2016). Populating the Hazard Register. In: Health Information Systems. Health Informatics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26612-1_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26612-1_13
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