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Adaptive Capability in Space and Time

  • Yoshiteru IshidaEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the Intelligent Systems Reference Library book series (ISRL, volume 101)

Abstract

In an information network composed of selfish agents pursuing their own profits, undesirable phenomena such as spam mail occur if the profit sharing and other game structures permit such equilibriums. We focused on applying the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma to control a network of selfish agents by allowing each agent to cooperate or to defect. Cooperation and defection respectively correspond to repair (using self-resource) and not repair (thus saving resource) in a self-repair network. Without modifying the payoff of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the network will be absorbed into the state of Nash equilibrium where all the agents become defectors and abnormal. Similarly to kin selection, agents favor survival of neighbors in organizing these two actions to prevent the network from being absorbed if payoffs are measured by summing all the neighboring agents. In this chapter, using the agent-based simulation, we assert that, even with this modification, the action organization exhibits spatial and temporal adaptability to the environment.

Keywords

Adaptation to the environment Dynamic environment Spatial strategies Maintenance of cooperating clusters Control of repair rate Agent-based simulations 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceToyohashi University of TechnologyToyohashiJapan

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