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Controlling Repairing Strategy: A Spatial Game Approach

  • Yoshiteru IshidaEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the Intelligent Systems Reference Library book series (ISRL, volume 101)

Abstract

We address the problem of cleaning up a contaminated network by mutual copying. This problem involves not only the double-edged sword where copying could further spread contamination but also mutual cooperation where resource-consuming copying could be left to others. This chapter applies the framework of the “spatial prisoner’s dilemma” in an evolutionary mechanism, with the aim of appropriate copying strategies emerging in an adaptive manner to the network environment. To introduce costs for repairing, an agent-based simulation is used to express cost as the resources consumed by each agent. As the benefit of repair to compensate for the cost, repairing is associated with copying the strategy of the repairing agents to the repaired agents. This biological mechanism for maintaining cooperative (and repairing) agents is the subject of this chapter. The risk of repairing by copying (another edge of the sword) is implemented as an increase of the failure rate of the repaired agent.

Keywords

Strategic repair Spatial prisoner’s dilemma Spatial strategies Maintenance of cooperating clusters Evolutionary mechanisms Agent-based simulations 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceToyohashi University of TechnologyToyohashiJapan

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