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Incentives for Repair in Self-Repair Networks

  • Yoshiteru IshidaEmail author
Chapter
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Part of the Intelligent Systems Reference Library book series (ISRL, volume 101)

Abstract

This chapter discusses when selfish agents begin to cooperate instead of defect, focusing on a specific task of self-maintenance. To consider the incentive for repair in a game theoretic framework, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is introduced in a two-nodes model for the network cleaning problem where a collection of agents capable of repairing other agents by modifying their contents can clean the collection. With this problem, cooperation corresponds to repairing other agents and defect to not repairing. Although both agents defecting is a Nash equilibrium—no agent is willing to repair others when only the repair cost is involved in the payoff—agents may cooperate with each other when system reliability is also incorporated in the payoff and with certain conditions satisfied. The incentive for cooperation will be stronger when a system-wide criterion such as availability is incorporated in the payoff.

Keywords

Reliability engineering Game theory Mechanism design Nash equilibrium Prisoner’s dilemma Hamilton’s rule Kin selection Multi-agent systems Mutual repair Autonomous distributed systems 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceToyohashi University of TechnologyToyohashiJapan

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