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Evaluation of Intrusion Detection Systems in Virtualized Environments Using Attack Injection

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 9404)

Abstract

The evaluation of intrusion detection systems (IDSes) is an active research area with many open challenges, one of which is the generation of representative workloads that contain attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for the rigorous evaluation of IDSes in virtualized environments, with a focus on IDSes designed to detect attacks leveraging or targeting the hypervisor via its hypercall interface. We present hInjector, a tool for generating IDS evaluation workloads by injecting such attacks during regular operation of a virtualized environment. We demonstrate the application of our approach and show its practical usefulness by evaluating a representative IDS designed to operate in virtualized environments. The virtualized environment of the industry-standard benchmark SPECvirt_sc2013 is used as a testbed, whose drivers generate workloads representative of workloads seen in production environments. This work enables for the first time the injection of attacks in virtualized environments for the purpose of generating representative IDS evaluation workloads.

Keywords

  • Intrusion detection systems
  • Virtualization
  • Evaluation
  • Attack injection

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Notes

  1. 1.

    http://www.ossec.net/; OSSEC can be configured to analyze in real-time log files that contain information on executed hypercalls.

  2. 2.

    http://www.google.com/patents/US8381284.

  3. 3.

    This raises the question whether hypercall activities are repeatable. We discuss this topic in Sect. 3.2.

  4. 4.

    We developed proof-of-concept code based on reverse-engineering the released patches fixing the considered vulnerabilities.

  5. 5.

    http://www.spec.org/virt_sc2013/.

  6. 6.

    We did not use any other virtualization mode because of a technical limitation; that is, the xentrace tool, which we use to capture benign hypercall activities in files for processing off-line, currently supports only full paravirtualization. However, support for other virtualization modes is currently being implemented.

  7. 7.

    An overview of the software and hardware requirements for deploying and running SPECvirt_sc2013 is available at https://www.spec.org/virt_sc2013/docs/SPECvirt_UserGuide.html.

  8. 8.

    In addition, we repeated the testing phase over 30 times observing that the obtained metric values negligibly differ from those we present here. This is primarily because of the high repeatability of hypercall activities and it indicates that only a small number of repetitions is needed to calculate statistically accurate metric values.

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Acknowledgments

This research has been supported by the Research Group of the Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC; http://www.spec.org, http://research.spec.org).

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Correspondence to Aleksandar Milenkoski .

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Milenkoski, A. et al. (2015). Evaluation of Intrusion Detection Systems in Virtualized Environments Using Attack Injection. In: Bos, H., Monrose, F., Blanc, G. (eds) Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses. RAID 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9404. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26362-5_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26362-5_22

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