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Feminist Versus General Philosophy of Science

  • Raffaella CampanerEmail author
  • Maria Carla Galavotti
Chapter
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science book series (BSPS, volume 317)

Abstract

This paper tackles some core issues feminist epistemologists have focused on, stressing on the one hand possible convergence with some current trends in the philosophy of science, and on the other the peculiar contribution of feminist philosophy of science to the general development of the discipline. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section argues that a “bottom-up” approach to the philosophy of science offers a promising background in which to meet the challenge posed by feminist epistemologists. The second section considers the influence of feminist stances in three specific fields: the life sciences, chemistry, and criminology. Feminist discourse has recently had a different impact on these fields both with regard to the objects and to the methods of investigation. The third section dwells upon whether and to what extent research lines emerging from feminist studies can influence the agenda of philosophy of science in general.

Keywords

Feminism Contextual empiricism Bottom-up epistemology Pluralism Social constructivism 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BolognaBolognaItaly

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