Abstract
Pettit’s program model aims at explaining causation at different levels of description, and it is considered to be applicable also to the case of mental causation. Here we question whether the sort of explanation offered by the program model faithfully accounts for the ontological aspects of causation. By applying the program model to the case of the computer game “Pong”, we show that the program model identifies causation also in cases where the relationship between events is intuitively of a purely epiphenomenal kind. Hence, the model should not be considered as a faithful identifier of “real” causation. In drawing an analogy to mental causation, we conclude that the program model would either (1) not be applicable to mental causation, (2) lead to reductive physicalism, or (3) be compatible with epiphenomenalism.
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Boström, K.J., Leonhard, G., Steinmetz, L. (2016). Playing Pong with the Mind? Pettit’s Program Model and Mental Causation. In: Derpmann, S., Schweikard, D. (eds) Philip Pettit: Five Themes from his Work. Münster Lectures in Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26103-4_5
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