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Device Attacker Models: Fact and Fiction

  • Jiangshan Yu
  • Mark D. RyanEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9379)

Abstract

According to standard fiction, a user is able to securely keep long term keys on his device. However, in fact his device may become infected with malware, and an adversary may obtain a copy of his key. We propose an attacker model in which devices are “periodically trustworthy” — they may become infected by malware, and then later become trustworthy again after software patches and malware scans have been applied, in an ongoing cycle. This paper proposes a solution to make the usage of private keys by attackers detectable by using public transparently-maintained logs to monitor the usage of long-term secret keys.

Keywords

Attacker model Key compromise detection Key usage monitoring 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Ross Anderson, Daniel Thomas, and all other attendees of International Workshop on Security Protocols for their comments and discussions. Jiangshan Yu is supported by the EPSRC project EP/H005501/1.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceUniversity of BirminghamBirminghamUK

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