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The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard and the Revocation of Feed in Tariffs—Foreign Renewable Energy Investments in Crisis-Struck Spain

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Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development

Abstract

This contribution explores a highly topical issue in international investment law—the protection of foreign investors’ legitimate expectations through the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard (FET) in case of a repeal of renewable energy support schemes. On the grounds of the Spanish case of disruptive cuts, particularly regarding Feed in Tariff regulation supporting photovoltaic energy since 2008, a possible violation of legitimate expectations is being assessed. The investors may rely on the stability of the Spanish régimen especial, despite their own conduct and the State’s right to regulate. Even in times of crisis the State may not justify changes in the regulation to the point of stripping away the very raison d’être of the initial investment. Such measures could constitute a breach of legitimate expectations. Regarding the current global trend of revoking renewable energy support schemes, the present case may initialize a cascade effect for a number of claims.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Enacted in 2009, the 2020 package consists of a set of binding legislation establishing three objectives to be reached by all Member States by 2020: to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20 %, to raise the energy consumption produced from renewable resources to 20 % and to improve the energy efficiency by 20 %.

  2. 2.

    These claims are (in chronological order): The PV Investors v Spain, Charanne (the Netherlands) and Construction Investments (Luxembourg) v Spain, Isolux Infrastructure Netherlands B.V. v Spain, CSP Equity.

    Investment S.à.r.l. v Spain, RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à.r.l. v Spain, Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v Spain, Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energia Solar Luxembourg S.à.r.l. v Spain, Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief UA v Spain, NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. and NextEra Energy Spain Holdings B.V. v Spain, InfraRed Environmental Infrastructure GP ltd. et al. v Spain, RENERGY S.à.r.l. v Spain, RWE Innogy GmbH and RWE Innogy Aersa S.A.U. v Spain, Stadtwerke München GmbH, RWE Innogy GmbH et al. v Spain, STEAG GmbH v Spain, 9REN Holding S.a.r.l v. Spain, BayWa r.e. Renewable Energy GmbH and BayWa r.e. Asset Holding GmbH v. Spain, Cube Infrastructure Fund SICAV and others v. Spain, Matthias Kruck and others v. Spain, KS Invest GmbH and TLS Invest GmbH v. Spain, JGC Corporation. v. Spain. Cases No. 31, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 50, 52, 53, 58, 61, 62, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71 and 72, respectively.

  3. 3.

    In Spain, laws and royal decree laws have the same position in the hierarchy of legal sources (statues) but differ in procedural terms. Laws are initiated and approved by the Congress. Royal decree laws are issued by the Government for extraordinary and urgent reasons, but have to be approved by the Congress. Regulations rank below statues, serve to complete, specify and implement statues and the Administration controls their whole development process.

  4. 4.

    See Part 2.1.

  5. 5.

    Translation by the authors.

  6. 6.

    PV energy tariffs defined in Table 3, under energy type b.1.

  7. 7.

    The Spanish Supreme Court refers to this type of retroactivity as “improper retroactivity” and considers it permissible because it only affects expectations, e.g. Spanish Supreme Court (2012) fifth legal basis.

  8. 8.

    Since 2013, major Spanish PV panels producers such as Isofotón, T-Solar, Siliken and 3S Soluciones have entered into state of bankruptcy, liquidation and cessation or suspension of activities.

  9. 9.

    For the Romanian Government’s Emergency Ordinances of 2013.

  10. 10.

    Para. 99: “[…] the standard is to some extent a flexible one which must to some extent be adapted to the circumstances of each case”.

  11. 11.

    As opposed to the relative standards of “national treatment” and “most favored nation treatment”.

  12. 12.

    Para. 107: “[…] there cannot be a single definition of FET, but that although its exact content is not predefined, except in cases where a treaty provides additional specifications”.

  13. 13.

    Energy Charter Treaty, Article 10(1) on the Promotion, Protection and Treatment of Investments:

    Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. Such Investments shall also enjoy the most constant protection and security and no Contracting Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. In no case shall such Investments be accorded treatment less favourable than that required by international law, including treaty obligations. […] Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting Party […].

  14. 14.

    For an explanation of Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs) see Part 1—Introduction.

  15. 15.

    Such was the remuneration for small photovoltaic plants regulated through R.D. 661/2007.

  16. 16.

    Considering the concept of legitimate expectations to have emanated from German law where it is extensively applied in the function of “Vertrauensschutz”.

  17. 17.

    Few IIAs, and mainly concerning the question of indirect expropriation, merely include the term of ‘investment-backed expectations’ such as the US Model BIT (2012), Annex B(4)(a)(ii). But also see the consolidated text of CETA (2014), stating in Article X.9, para. 4: "When applying the above fair and equitable treatment obligation, a tribunal may take into account whether a Party made a specific representation to an investor to induce a covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which the investor relied in deciding to make or maintain the covered investment, but that the Party subsequently frustrated [...]".

  18. 18.

    Furthermore, within a contextual interpretation, the ECT preamble’s wording, with its aim to “liberalize investment” and by its explicit labelling the of the ECT’s commitments as legally binding, suggests that the State is under an obligation to provide a high level of investment protection.

  19. 19.

    Para. 226: “In examining the various cases that have justifiably considered the legitimate expectations of investors and the extent to which the host government has frustrated them, this Tribunal finds that an important element of such cases has not been sufficiently emphasized: that investors, deriving their expectations from the laws and regulations adopted by the host country, acted in reliance upon those laws and regulations and changed their economic position as a result”.

  20. 20.

    Para. 208: “Argentina through its laws, the treaties it signed, its government statements, and especially the elaborate legal framework which it designed and enacted, deliberately and actively sought to create those expectations in the Claimants and other potential investors in order to obtain the capital and technology that it needed to revitalize and expand the Buenos Aires water and sewage system.”.

  21. 21.

    The high standards for legitimate expectations set in the awards in line with Parkerings will have to be regarded as exceptions, especially because there was each time a contract between the investor and the Host State.

  22. 22.

    See above Part 2.2.1.

  23. 23.

    Until R.D. 1565/2010, the regulatory framework included no lifetime caps, see above.

  24. 24.

    As a legal basis for such an argument the exceptions of Article 24(3)(c) ECT may be invoked, as it is not explicitly inapplicable to Article 10 ECT. However, the Spanish measures cannot be construed as “for the maintenance of public order”, for in this case the latter did not seem at stake as a consequence of the economic crisis.

  25. 25.

    At least three elements support this claim. First, while the Argentine Government passed the Corralito in 2001 for “fencing in” withdrawals and prohibiting international transfers, no limits on bank withdrawals have been imposed in Spain. See Argentine Decree No. 1570/01 of 1 December 2001 (Argentina 2001). Second, contrary to Argentina, Spain has not defaulted on its debts. Third, unlike what happened in Argentina, no international institution such as the International Monetary Fund has intervened in Spain. Furthermore, not even in the Argentine Gas Cases was financial crisis alone a sufficient argument for a permitted breach of international standards of investment protection with National Grid being the only exception.

  26. 26.

    See Part 2.2.2.

  27. 27.

    See above Part 2.2.2.

  28. 28.

    E.g. Article 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution; Article 20(3) of the German Constitution.

  29. 29.

    See above Part 2.2.2.

  30. 30.

    See above Part 3.2.3.

  31. 31.

    See Part 2.2.2.

  32. 32.

    R.D. 661/2007.

  33. 33.

    First, Article 2 in conjunction with Table 3 of R.D. 661/2007 promised a certain sum of payment for an unlimited period of time, offering significantly higher sums to PV energy suppliers, hence, de facto specifying the addressees of the tariff. Second, the progression of implementation over a long time generated a more reliable, more credible regime, of a prospective nature. Third, the purpose of the FiT regime in Spain comprised environmental goals, as well as the industrial policy objectives of fostering the development of domestic innovative technology. This underscores the State’s inducement ambitions once more.

  34. 34.

    See Part 3.2.2.

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Dromgool, T., Enguix, D.Y. (2016). The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard and the Revocation of Feed in Tariffs—Foreign Renewable Energy Investments in Crisis-Struck Spain. In: Mauerhofer, V. (eds) Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26021-1_20

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