Economic-Robust Session Based Spectrum Trading

  • Miao Pan
  • Ming Li
  • Pan Li
  • Yuguang Fang
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering book series (BRIEFSELECTRIC)


This chapter further extends the session based spectrum trading into an economic-robust session based one. Beyond considering the end-to-end performance of spectrum trading as illustrated in last chapter, the economic-robust session based spectrum trading also guarantee the economic properties of spectrum trading such as incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance. By employing two bidding manners, i.e., bidding for the whole session and unit rate bidding, we formulate the spectrum trading problems under multiple economic and multi-hop CR transmission constraints, design two pricing mechanisms to charge the winning spectrum bidders, and further mathematically prove the economic-robustness of the proposed spectrum trading schemes. Through extensive simulations, we show the proposed schemes are economic-robust and effective in improving spectrum utilization.


Cognitive Radio Sessions; Economic Robustness; Critical Value; Pricing Mechanism 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Miao Pan
    • 1
  • Ming Li
    • 2
  • Pan Li
    • 3
  • Yuguang Fang
    • 4
  1. 1.University of HoustonHoustonUSA
  2. 2.University of NevadaRenoUSA
  3. 3.Case Western Reserve UniversityClevelandUSA
  4. 4.University of FloridaGainesvilleUSA

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