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Economic-Robust Transmission Opportunity Based Spectrum Trading

  • Miao Pan
  • Ming Li
  • Pan Li
  • Yuguang Fang
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering book series (BRIEFSELECTRIC)

Abstract

Under the network architecture illustrated in Chap.  1, in this chapter, we further introduce a transmission opportunity based spectrum trading scheme, called TOST, which can support multi-hop data traffic, ensure economic-robustness (i.e., incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance), and generate high revenue for the spectrum trader. Specifically, in TOST, instead of spectrum bands as in traditional spectrum trading schemes, users bid for transmission opportunities (TOs). A TO is defined as the permit of data transmission on a specific link using a certain band, i.e., a link-band pair. The TOST scheme is composed of three procedures: TO allocation, TO scheduling, and pricing, which are performed sequentially and iteratively until the aforementioned goals are reached. We prove that TOST is economic-robust, and conduct extensive simulations to show its effectiveness and efficiency.

Keywords

Transmission Opportunity; Multi-Hop Data Transmission; Economic-Robust 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Miao Pan
    • 1
  • Ming Li
    • 2
  • Pan Li
    • 3
  • Yuguang Fang
    • 4
  1. 1.University of HoustonHoustonUSA
  2. 2.University of NevadaRenoUSA
  3. 3.Case Western Reserve UniversityClevelandUSA
  4. 4.University of FloridaGainesvilleUSA

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