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Sequentially Composable Rational Proofs

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Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9406))

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Abstract

We show that Rational Proofs do not satisfy basic compositional properties in the case where a large number of “computation problems” are outsourced. We show that a “fast” incorrect answer is more remunerable for the prover, by allowing him to solve more problems and collect more rewards. We present an enhanced definition of Rational Proofs that removes the economic incentive for this strategy and we present a protocol that achieves it for some uniform bounded-depth circuits.

This work was supported by NSF grant CNS-1545759

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Notes

  1. 1.

    If we think of cost as time, then in the same time interval in which P solves one problem, \(\widetilde{P}\) can solve up to n problems, earning a lot more money, by answering fast and incorrectly.

  2. 2.

    We point out that the Prover can provide the Verifier with the requested gate and then the Verifier can use the uniformity of the circuit to check that the Prover has given him the correct gate at each level in time O(T(n)).

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Correspondence to Rosario Gennaro .

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Campanelli, M., Gennaro, R. (2015). Sequentially Composable Rational Proofs. In: Khouzani, M., Panaousis, E., Theodorakopoulos, G. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9406. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_15

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-25593-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-25594-1

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