A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks
Market mechanisms play a key role in allocating and pricing commuters and drivers in new on-demand transport services such as Uber, and Liftago in Prague. These services successfully use different mechanisms, which suggests a need to understand the behavior of a range of mechanisms within the context of on-demand transport. In this paper, we propose a double auction mechanism and compare its performance to a mechanism inspired by Liftago’s approach. We show that our mechanism can improve efficiency and satisfy key properties such as weak budget balance and truthfulness.
KeywordsDouble auction On-demand transport Taxis
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