International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems

PRIMA 2015: PRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems pp 557-565

A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks

  • Malcolm Egan
  • Martin Schaefer
  • Michal Jakob
  • Nir Oren
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-25524-8_38

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9387)
Cite this paper as:
Egan M., Schaefer M., Jakob M., Oren N. (2015) A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks. In: Chen Q., Torroni P., Villata S., Hsu J., Omicini A. (eds) PRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 9387. Springer, Cham

Abstract

Market mechanisms play a key role in allocating and pricing commuters and drivers in new on-demand transport services such as Uber, and Liftago in Prague. These services successfully use different mechanisms, which suggests a need to understand the behavior of a range of mechanisms within the context of on-demand transport. In this paper, we propose a double auction mechanism and compare its performance to a mechanism inspired by Liftago’s approach. We show that our mechanism can improve efficiency and satisfy key properties such as weak budget balance and truthfulness.

Keywords

Double auction On-demand transport Taxis 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Malcolm Egan
    • 1
  • Martin Schaefer
    • 1
  • Michal Jakob
    • 1
  • Nir Oren
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculty of Electrical EngineeringCzech Technical University in PraguePragueCzech Republic
  2. 2.Department of Computing ScienceUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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