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Nuclear Testing and the NPT

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Abstract

The CTBT bans nuclear explosions of any yield, in all places, and for all time. CTBT is an arms control measure that constrains the five nuclear weapons states from developing new weapons.

…. to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

[NPT Preamble]

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament…. [Article VI].

[Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1970]

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Graham and Hafemeister (2009).

  2. 2.

    The author was technical lead on TTBT compliance in the State Department (1987), testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on TTBT (October 1988), was lead technical SFRC staff (1990–1992) on TTBT ratification and Mitchell-Hatfield testing ban, and was the lead NAS technical staff on the CTBT study (2000–2002).

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Correspondence to David Hafemeister .

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Hafemeister, D. (2016). Nuclear Testing and the NPT. In: Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism in the Post-9/11 World. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25367-1_11

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