Problems at the Basis of Susan Haack’s Foundherentism
In her book Evidence and Inquiry (1993/2009), Susan Haack develops an account of epistemic justification called “foundherentism.” Foundherentism is supposed to be an intermediate position between foundationalism and coherentism that leads to a solution of well-known problems these standard accounts face. In our paper, we discuss Haack’s foundherentism and argue that it shares an important trait with foundationalism, a trait that is at the core of one of the biggest problems of foundationalist theories. And as it seems to us, Haack’s foundherentism does not supply the resources for a satisfying solution to this problem.
KeywordsStandard Account Propositional Content Justify Belief Basic Belief Epistemic Justification
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