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Problems at the Basis of Susan Haack’s Foundherentism

  • Nikolai Ruppert
  • Riske Schlüter
  • Ansgar Seide
Chapter
Part of the Münster Lectures in Philosophy book series (MUELP, volume 2)

Abstract

In her book Evidence and Inquiry (1993/2009), Susan Haack develops an account of epistemic justification called “foundherentism.” Foundherentism is supposed to be an intermediate position between foundationalism and coherentism that leads to a solution of well-known problems these standard accounts face. In our paper, we discuss Haack’s foundherentism and argue that it shares an important trait with foundationalism, a trait that is at the core of one of the biggest problems of foundationalist theories. And as it seems to us, Haack’s foundherentism does not supply the resources for a satisfying solution to this problem.

Keywords

Standard Account Propositional Content Justify Belief Basic Belief Epistemic Justification 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nikolai Ruppert
    • 1
  • Riske Schlüter
    • 1
  • Ansgar Seide
    • 1
  1. 1.Philosophisches SeminarWWU MünsterMünsterGermany

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