The Evolution of Legal Systems: Response to Helena Baldina, Andreas Bruns, and Johannes Müller-Salo

  • Susan Haack
Part of the Münster Lectures in Philosophy book series (MUELP, volume 2)


Helena Baldina, Andreas Bruns, and Johannes Müller-Salo write of the “Haack-Holmes Conception of Law.” Flattering as this is, I should begin by saying plainly that what I mean by calling my (still-developing) legal philosophy “neo-classical legal pragmatism” is that it calls on ideas not only from Holmes, but also from C. S. Peirce, from John Dewey, and from William James—to whom I owe the marvelously Janus-faced concept of a pluralistic universe. And it bears emphasizing that I accept these pragmatist ideas not because they are pragmatist, but because, so far as I can tell, they are true.

That said, from here on I’ll focus specifically on three questions that Baldina et al. raise: (i) how I understand Holmes’s idea of law as prediction; (ii) what I mean by writing of the evolution of legal systems; and (iii) how I see the differences between common-law and civil-law régimes.


Legal System Expert Testimony Alternative Dispute Resolution Legal Philosophy Bradford Hill Criterion 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of LawUniversity of MiamiMiamiUSA

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