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A Game Theoretic Framework for Modeling Adversarial Cyber Security Game Among Attackers, Defenders, and Users

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 9331)

Abstract

This paper models interactions in the cyber environment as a three-way security game between attacker, defender, and user. The paper focuses on understanding and modeling the roles, motivations and conflicting objectives of the players. Unlike most research in cyber security, this paper studies not only technological but also psychosocial aspects of the interactions. The paper develops recommendations for selecting games that have relevant features for representing cyber security interactions and outlines directions for future research.

Keywords

  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Security Policy
  • Intrusion Detection System
  • Successful Attack
  • Social Reward

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Richard John and Heather Rosoff for discussions and feedback that helped develop the ideas expressed in this paper. This research was supported by funding the National Science Foundation under award No. 1314644.

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Correspondence to Tatyana Ryutov .

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Ryutov, T., Orosz, M., Blythe, J., von Winterfeldt, D. (2015). A Game Theoretic Framework for Modeling Adversarial Cyber Security Game Among Attackers, Defenders, and Users. In: Foresti, S. (eds) Security and Trust Management. STM 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9331. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24858-5_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24858-5_18

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-24857-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-24858-5

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