Abstract
We perceive the objective world through a subjective perceptual veil. Various perceived properties, particularly “secondary qualities” like colours and tastes, are mind-dependent. Although mind-dependent, our knowledge of many facts about the perceptual veil is immediate and secure. These are well-known facets of sense-datum theory. My aim is to carve out a conception of sense-datum theory that does not require the immediate and secure knowledge of a wealth of facts about experienced sense-data (§1). Such a theory is of value on its own, given well-known challenges to epistemic foundationalism. Beyond this such a theory helps demonstrate how sense-datum theory can accommodate challenging perceptual phenomena like shape and size constancies (§3). These ideas are bridged by the roots of perceptual ambiguity (§2). In brief, my thought is that tapering acquaintance knowledge creates space for perceptual representation to resolve the ambiguities in presented objects seemingly inherent in scenarios involving perceptual constancies. Key relations between this approach and those of other acquaintance views (e.g., direct realism) are discussed. Thus, I offer a two-factor (acquaintance-representation) sense-datum theory to meet the challenge posed by constancies. Following Smith (2002), from whom this challenge is drawn, my focus is on shape and size constancies. Other constancies, notably colour constancy, are treated elsewhere (Brown 2014).
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- 1.
- 2.
Very roughly, the path to EF might proceed as follows: (a) something perceptually appears F to perceiver A iff that thing is F; (b) if something perceptually appears F to A then A can contemplate the basic proposition 〈x is F〉; (c) given (a), (b) and some stipulations about what constitutes knowledge, if something perceptually appears F to A then A can know that x is F. For example Russell commits to a strong EF in Problems of Philosophy, and Robinson’s “Phenomenal Principle” (1994, 32) can also be used to ground EF. See §§1 and 3 for discussion.
- 3.
Perceptual relativity refers to the ways things perceptually seem to change as a host of perceptual variables change and perceptual illusion to our misperceptions of things. Hallucinations are roughly experiences of things (e.g., a dragon) that do not in fact exist in the part of the objective world being purportedly perceived.
An argument from perceptual relativity is used for example by Russell in the opening pages of Problems of Philosophy, by Robinson (1994) in defense of his sense-datum theory, and by Cohen (2009) to motivate his relationalist theory of colour. See Macpherson and Platchias (2013) for recent work on the difficult topic of hallucination, and the introduction to that work for an informative overview.
Criticisms and discussions of the arguments for IR can be found for example in Austin (1962), Burnyeat (1979/1980), Smith (2002), Gupta (2006) and elsewhere.
- 4.
More recently, Chalmers regards the speckled hen challenge as one of the core problems for what he calls “projectivism”, which is fairly close to our sense-datum theory (2006, 82). See also §1.
- 5.
I follow Siegel (2006) in interpreting Smith as utilizing constancies to generate a challenge for sense-datum theory. Smith (2006) claims that this is a misinterpretation, that he was instead intending to explain why a theory utilizing a certain conception of perceptual sensations—a conception not utilized by traditional sense-datum theory—cannot explain constancies by reference to those sensations. I hope it is obvious that regardless of Smith’s intentions his remarks (quoted in §3 of this work) can be used to generate a challenge for sense-datum theory, one that I (and Siegel) believe is worth addressing.
- 6.
- 7.
Here is a rough explication. Direct realist presentationalists define perceptual experience by reference to objective things presented to perceivers (e.g., Campbell 2002; Brewer 2011). Sense-datum theorists are a kind of literal projectivist, defining perceptual experience by reference to presented sense-data and the features they instantiate. Figurative projectivists define perceptual experience by reference to presented features that are not instantiated by any presented object (i.e., they are instantiated neither by a subjective entity like sense-data nor by presented objective things). I take both forms of projectivism to be kinds of IR.
- 8.
It is typically additionally allowed that there are nonbasic propositions about sense-data and that at least some of these can be known by suitably endowed perceivers.
- 9.
I am here using ‘thing’ to range over objects, properties and facts.
- 10.
- 11.
As with the distinction between direct and indirect perception, when one delves more deeply into the distinction between basic and inferred statements or propositions various difficulties emerge. I must leave these to another time.
- 12.
Gupta (2006) argues that what is epistemically given in experience should be taken to have the logical form of a function as opposed to that of a proposition. However, he is not attempting explicate knowledge by acquaintance or sense-datum theory.
- 13.
One could argue that Russell was not wedded to the ‘perfection’ and ‘completeness’ of acquaintance knowledge. In responding to Dawes Hick’s’ (1912) review of Problems of Philosophy Russell identified Problems as “a popular book where technicalities have to be avoided” and proceeded to “state as precisely as possible” his view (1913, 76). In what follows he makes no mention of these notions, and instead emphasizes the existential characterization of acquaintance I am about to introduce.
- 14.
Regarding the latter see again the references in Footnote 1.
- 15.
One must further consider whether one is acquainted with something if and only if one is perceptually aware of it, or whether the conditional should only go in one of the two directions. I am content with the biconditional in place, but will not discuss the matter here.
- 16.
“[I]t would be rash to assume that human beings ever, in fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing some truth about them” (Russell 2007, 31).
- 17.
Recall Russell’s fundamental principle regarding descriptive knowledge: “Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted” (2007, 40).
- 18.
I take it as straightforward that this acquaintance doctrine satisfies a robust form of perceptual presence, and assume that “relationalists” (as, e.g., discussed in Crane 2006), and naïve and direct realists (Campbell 2002; Brewer 2011) are for our purposes individuals who see something like this minimal acquaintance doctrine (save perhaps the Infallible element) as definitive of perceptual states. Relationalists of course come in both direct and indirect realist strains—I will be focused on the latter. Acquaintance is also often taken to be a form of nonconceptual perceptual awareness. With a few exceptions to follow, I wish to remain mute on this issue. I see it working in the background in various places, but would have to greatly lengthen the work to bring them all out. [E.g., relationalists like McDowell (1994) and Brewer (2011) take the relations to the world afforded by perception to be thoroughly conceptual.] Note that Peacocke’s (1983) acquaintance doctrine is distinct from mine. I regrettably do not have the space for comparison.
- 19.
The classic statement of adverbialism is Chisholm (1957). Four of many defenses of intentionalism are Harman (1990), Dretske (1995), Tye (2000) and Byrne (2001). One can argue (as Hilbert 2004 does) that the contemporary root of the intentionalist movement is Armstrong (1961). A possible third alternative is qualia realism (see, e.g., Block 2003; Stoljar 2004), though for example Stoljar sees this as a variant of adverbialism. See Brown (2010 and forthcoming) for a discussion of how qualia realism fits into the landscape.
- 20.
For example, in Problems of Philosophy, when discussing our capacity to be acquainted with complex facts Russell asserts: “In all cases where we know by acquaintance a complex fact consisting of certain terms in a certain relation, we say that the truth that these terms are so related has the first or absolute kind of self-evidence, and in these cases the judgement that the terms are so related must be true. Thus this sort of self-evidence is an absolute guarantee of truth” (2007, 99).
- 21.
Dretske’s (1993) solution to the speckled hen problem, which emerges from his distinction between object seeing and fact seeing, is very similar to the present one, although he does not identify its connection to Russell’s view. Ayer’s (1940) solution (recently endorsed by Tye (2009, 2010), minus the commitment to sense-datum theory) holds that the number of apparent speckles is indeterminate. While I can envisage scenarios in which this might be useful (see, e.g., Nanay 2009) it is an odd and to my mind unsatisfying way of dealing with the problem. Unfortunately, a thorough discussion of these matters would take us too far afield.
- 22.
I thus do not mean by ‘stimulus’ or ‘given’ the pattern of light reaching the eye (i.e., the retinal or proximal image; the ‘sensory core’ of Hatfield and Epstein 1979), although the term is sometimes used in this way. A stimulus in my sense is distal (not proximal), consisting of the objects and properties (perhaps also facts) being perceived along with the ways those entities are presenting themselves to the agent at the time of her perception. Compare with Schellenberg’s (2008) ‘situation-dependent properties’ and the objects possessing them. Her view is discussed in Brown (2012). Also compare presentational features with Hopkins’ (1998) ‘outline shape’.
- 23.
Note that there is no requirement that in every case the subject be aware that this perceptual difference involves “flipping” between two ways of seeing a the same stimulus (as opposed to seeing different stimuli), though in many cases humans would be aware of this. There is also no requirement that the subject see the presentational features before her “on their own”, that is, as a distinct set of features. Indeed I think it is unlikely that this ever occurs. Instead, I suspect that we are able to infer a set of presentational features from perceptual experience by abstraction, and only then have distinct awareness of them. I regret being unable to dwell on these matters.
- 24.
These judgements are likely informed by evolutionary pressures, life learning and perhaps other elements of the perceptual scene. They are thus to some degree contingent. Stimulus ambiguity of some sort is the norm in most perceptual research, be it of the sort described in the text or of the sort that identifies the stimulus with the retinal image (or a suitable analogue for other senses). One common response is to isolate operational constraints that are used or could be used by our vision system to cut down on the possible disambiguations. With respect to shape perception familiar constraints include objects are rigid, objects persist, etc. (see, e.g., Spelke 1990); in colour perception constraints might include assumptions about the composition of common light, and so on (see, e.g., Wandell 1989). These constraints are presumed (by this author and others) to operate subpersonally in an intermediate stage of visual processing and to be at least largely impenetrable by higher-level cognition (see, e.g., Raftopoulos 2009, 2010). The vision system applies them to illumination information retrieved by the retina (in early vision) and computes or “judges” which disambiguation(s) represent the most probable objects of (i.e., external objects causing) that perceptual state. What I suggest follows squarely in this framework. However, I am not committed to the variety of cognitive impenetrability that, e.g., Raftopoulos defends, but instead have sympathies with cognitive penetration (see, e.g., Macpherson 2012).
- 25.
I have attempted to reply to one influential objection of this sort in Brown (2012).
- 26.
Perceptual constancies “involve a change in [e.g.,] visual experience, a change in visual sensation, despite the fact that the object of awareness does not itself appear to change at all…the changing sensations always manifest to us a changing relation in which an intrinsically unchanging object comes to stand to us” (Smith 2002, 172).
- 27.
- 28.
See, e.g., Russell’s distinction between the “apparent” and “private” space of sense-data and the “real” and “public” space of physical things in Chap. 3 of Problems of Philosophy. See also Siegel (2006), who calls this general kind of response the “complex sense-data option” (391; see, esp. pp. 384–5). Note that Siegel doesn’t consider the criticism of this response made in what follows.
- 29.
E.g., Meadows (2013) considers a different kind of error involving constancies than what is in the text. The example in the text is more directly relevant to the aims of this paper and hence what I focus on.
- 30.
Please note that the following analysis of shape and size constancy does not generalize to colour constancy. For a discussion of the latter see Brown (2014), where a model of colour constancy is developed that is consistent with a variety of perceptual theories, including sense-datum theory. We are here focusing on shape constancy and its peculiarities because of the use to which Smith has put it. In my view Smith’s argument becomes far less plausible when applied to colour constancy phenomena (something he does not do in any detail), so avoiding discussion of the topic does not diminish from the cogency of my response.
- 31.
- 32.
Consider the fact that the shapes on a television screen that represent a rotating penny are not themselves constant but instead constantly changing. We do not, however, see them as representing a nonrigid nonrotating object but instead as representing a rigid rotating object. This achievement is due to a disambiguation bias in our vision systems, not due to an intrinsic roundness being forced upon us.
- 33.
E.g., Byrne and Logue (2008) is a recent collection on disjunctivism.
- 34.
Siegel (2006) considers a two-factor response to Smith’s challenge. There are a few differences in our presentation that I will leave to the reader, and an important difference in analysis: she does not consider what’s left in the sensory core once the two-factor response has been employed and what consequences may follow from that consideration; by contrast in what follows I focus precisely on these issues.
- 35.
I presume that we can remain mute as to whether or not these representations involve concepts.
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Brown, D.H. (2016). A Study in Deflated Acquaintance Knowledge: Sense-Datum Theory and Perceptual Constancy. In: Costreie, S. (eds) Early Analytic Philosophy - New Perspectives on the Tradition. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 80. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24214-9_5
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