Abstract
The aim of this work is to provide a historical reconstruction of the interconnections between Carnap’s Aufbau, Kuhn’s model of theory change, and the structuralist view of scientific theories. I will discuss how the structuralist view takes its motivations from Carnap’s early work, especially from the Aufbau. Carnap’s idea of purely structural definite descriptions exposed in the Aufbau can be seen analogous with the goal of the structuralist view of representing our knowledge about scientific theories structurally. Such Carnapian purely structural definite descriptions of our knowledge guarantee the objectivity and intersubjectivity of our claims. In the same way, structuralist philosophy of science aims to provide objective and ontologically neutral descriptions of the logical structure of our scientific theories. As a further step, I will also discuss how the development of the structuralist view is strongly motivated by Kuhn’s conception of theory change.
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Notes
- 1.
Translated from the German original by the author.
- 2.
The supposed neutrality of the structuralist view has been mentioned to me several times in personal conversations by several of its leading adherents, such as C. Ulises Moulines, Wolfgang Balzer, Pablo Lorenzano, and José Díez.
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Meier, T. (2016). On the Interconnections Between Carnap, Kuhn, and Structuralist Philosophy of Science. In: Costreie, S. (eds) Early Analytic Philosophy - New Perspectives on the Tradition. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 80. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24214-9_16
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