IFIP International Conference on Information Security Theory and Practice

Information Security Theory and Practice pp 203-218

On Linkability and Malleability in Self-blindable Credentials

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9311)

Abstract

Self-blindable credential schemes allow users to anonymously prove ownership of credentials. This is achieved by randomizing the credential before each showing in such a way that it still remains valid. As a result, each time a different version of the same credential is presented. A number of such schemes have been proposed, but unfortunately many of them are broken, in the sense that they are linkable (i.e., failing to protect the privacy of the user), or malleable (i.e., they allow users to create new credentials using one or more valid credentials given to them). In this paper we prove a general theorem that relates linkability and malleability in self-blindable credential schemes, and that can test whether a scheme is linkable or malleable. After that we apply the theorem to a number of self-blindable credential schemes to show that they suffer from one or both of these issues.

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jaap-Henk Hoepman
    • 1
  • Wouter Lueks
    • 1
  • Sietse Ringers
    • 2
  1. 1.Radboud UniversityNijmegenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Johann Bernoulli Institute for Mathematics and Computer ScienceUniversity of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands

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