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New Frontiers in the Study of Social Phenomena pp 41–64Cite as

Reciprocity, Punishment, Institutions: The Streets to Social Collaboration—New Theories on How Emerging Social Artifacts Control Our Lives in Society

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Abstract

What mechanisms induce and support cooperation in social interaction? Traditional rational-choice perspective has resulted ineffective to keep track of complex real-world dynamics of cooperation. On the other hand, perspectives based on the justification of fairness preferences as internalized behavioural forces driving realistic cooperative interactions are notoriously incomplete and rather fuzzy with respect to their theoretical foundations. After considering recognized evolutionary accounts of the emergence and resilience of social standards, we endorse the view according to which the key to understanding evolutionary dynamics of social engagement is to be found in individual motivational attitudes to interaction. But, beyond any psychological implications, we suggest not exiting from the “logic of reciprocity” in considering the rationality of preferences for social interaction. Preliminary supporting experimental evidence is provided.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Sanctions, for instance, can be rightly regarded as exogenous incentive for support of sociality, but even sanction efficacy must count on some preference for social reciprocation: if I could do without sociality, I would also take no interest in sanction.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Pavia, Piazza Botta 6, Pavia, Italy

    Giuliana Gerace M.Sc.

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  1. Giuliana Gerace M.Sc.
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Correspondence to Giuliana Gerace M.Sc. .

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  1. Institute of Cognitive Science and Technology – CNR, Rome, Italy

    Federico Cecconi

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Gerace, G. (2016). Reciprocity, Punishment, Institutions: The Streets to Social Collaboration—New Theories on How Emerging Social Artifacts Control Our Lives in Society. In: Cecconi, F. (eds) New Frontiers in the Study of Social Phenomena. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23938-5_3

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