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R2U2: Monitoring and Diagnosis of Security Threats for Unmanned Aerial Systems

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9333)

Abstract

We present R2U2, a novel framework for runtime monitoring of security properties and diagnosing of security threats on-board Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). R2U2, implemented in FPGA hardware, is a real-time, Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit for security threat detection. R2U2 is designed to continuously monitor inputs from the GPS and the ground control station, sensor readings, actuator outputs, and flight software status. By simultaneously monitoring and performing statistical reasoning, attack patterns and post-attack discrepancies in the UAS behavior can be detected. R2U2 uses runtime observer pairs for linear and metric temporal logics for property monitoring and Bayesian networks for diagnosis of security threats. We discuss the design and implementation that now enables R2U2 to handle security threats and present simulation results of several attack scenarios on the NASA DragonEye UAS.

Keywords

Bayesian Network Temporal Logic Linear Temporal Logic Security Threat Attack Scenario 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.SGT, Inc.NASA AmesMoffett FieldUSA
  2. 2.University of CincinnatiCincinnatiUSA

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