Physical Layer Security: A Paradigm Shift in Data Confidentiality

  • Arsenia Chorti
  • Camilla Hollanti
  • Jean-Claude Belfiore
  • Harold Vincent Poor
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering book series (LNEE, volume 358)

Abstract

Physical layer security (PLS) draws on information theory to characterize the fundamental ability of the wireless physical layer to ensure data confidentiality. In the PLS framework it has been established that it is possible to simultaneously achieve reliability in transmitting messages to an intended destination and perfect secrecy of those messages with respect to an eavesdropper by using appropriate encoding schemes that exploit the noise and fading effects of wireless communication channels. Today, after more than 15 years of research in the area, PLS has the potential to provide novel security solutions that can be integrated into future generations of mobile communication systems. This chapter presents a tutorial on advances in this area. The treatment begins with a review of the fundamental PLS concepts and their corresponding historical background. Subsequently it reviews some of the most significant advances in coding theory and system design that offer a concrete platform for the realization of the promise of this approach in data confidentiality.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Arsenia Chorti
    • 1
  • Camilla Hollanti
    • 2
  • Jean-Claude Belfiore
    • 3
  • Harold Vincent Poor
    • 4
  1. 1.School of Computer Science and Electronic EngineeringUniversity of EssexColchesterUK
  2. 2.Department of Mathematics and Systems AnalysisAalto University School of ScienceAaltoFinland
  3. 3.Department of Communications and ElectronicsTelecom ParisTechParis Cedex 13France
  4. 4.Department of Electrical EngineeringEQUAD, Princeton UniversityPrincetonUSA

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