Abstract
A parliament could elect an executive, or any group of people could elect a fixed number of individuals to form a team in which each person chosen undertakes quite separate functions, by a matrix vote. There is one (paper or electronic) ballot, but two counts. In electing a cabinet of, say, six persons, the first count is to choose the six most popular candidates, who then form the executive; the procedure is proportional, so this cabinet is (almost) bound to represent all the (main) parties in parliament. The second count, though based on these same preferences, is a points system to see who of these newly elected individuals shall be appointed to which portfolio. This chapter first describes the functions of the matrix vote; next, it outlines the rules for the election; then, with two theoretical examples from both a partisan and a non-partisan scenario, it shows how an entire parliament can participate on an equal basis in the choice of its executive; finally, it examines the methodology and concludes that it is inclusive, ethno-colour blind, fair, robust and accurate. The rules for the conduct of a matrix vote are in Annex II.
Amongst the principles [we] pursued… is that out of any debate… there should be no winners or losers.
President Nelson , addressing the final sitting of South Africa’s first democratic parliament, 26.3.1999.
The original version of this chapter was revised. The erratum to this chapter is available at DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-23500-4_8.
An erratum to this chapter can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23500-4_8
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Notes
- 1.
If x voters give a 1st preference to Joan and a 2nd preference to Jean, and if y voters give a 1st preference to Jean and a 2nd preference to Joan, and if (x + y) ≥ 2 quotas, then the Jean/Joan pair is deemed to have two quotas.
- 2.
Needless to say, not every count will see all candidates elected on the basis of a quota of 1st preferences. Indeed, in a very disparate parliament as in the drc (Sect. 4.1.3.1), it is possible that none would be elected on the quotas, and all of the successful candidates would be chosen at the final stage of the count, i.e., on the basis of their mbc scores only.
References
Emerson, P. (2007). Designing an all-inclusive democracy. Heidelberg: Springer.
Emerson, P. (2010). Proportionality without transference: The merits of the Quota Borda System, QBS. Representation, 46(2), 197–209.
Emerson, P. (2012). Defining democracy (2nd ed.). Heidelberg: Springer.
Wilford, R. (2009). Consociational government: Inside the devolved Northern Ireland executive. In R. Taylor (Ed.), Consociational theory. Abingdon: Routledge.
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Emerson, P. (2016). Electing a Proportional All-Party, Power-Sharing Executive. In: From Majority Rule to Inclusive Politics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23500-4_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23500-4_6
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