Service Markets

Part of the Service Science: Research and Innovations in the Service Economy book series (SSRI)


A key aspect of service systems is exploring and studying their economic and business components. Services are commonly part of an ecosystem that consists of other services (potentially competitors), service consumers, and further aspects such as underlying laws and regulations. This chapter focuses on the design and analysis of service markets, which define how services are purchased and exchanged. In particular, market engineering is discussed as a structured approach to study service markets. This chapter should be regarded as an entry point into this domain, and assumes no prior knowledge. Therefore, a key focal point is on establishing the fundamental aspects of service markets from an economic point of view along with a methodology (agent-based computational economics) for their study and analysis.


Multi Agent System Price Strategy Service Market Static Price Market Engineering 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Karlsruhe Service Research Institute (KSRI)Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)KarlsruheGermany

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