Skip to main content

Is the Equal-Weight View Really Supported by Positive Crowd Effects?

  • Chapter
  • 819 Accesses

Part of the book series: European Studies in Philosophy of Science ((ESPS,volume 1))

Abstract

In the debate of epistemic peer disagreement the equal-weight view suggests to split the difference between one’s own and one’s peer’s opinions. An argument in favour of this view—which is prominently held by Adam Elga—is that by such a difference-splitting one may make some use of a so-called wise-crowd effect. In this paper it is argued that such a view faces two main problems: First, the problem that the standards for making use of a wise-crowd effect are quite low. And second, the problem that following the equal-weight view decreases such effects and by this the argument’s own basis is defeated. We therefore come to the conclusion that an argument for the equal-weight view with the help of wise-crowd effects as provided more or less explicitly by Elga does not succeed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

References

  • Dietrich, F. (2008). The premises of Condorcet’s Jury theorem are not simultaneously justified. Episteme, 5(01), 56–73. ISSN:1750-0117. doi:10.3366/E1742360008000233. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1742360000000927

  • Douven, I. (2010). Simulating peer disagreements. Studies in history and philosophy of science part A, 41(2), 148–157. ISSN:0039-3681. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.03.010. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368110000221

  • Elga, A. (2007). Reflection and disagreement. English. Noûs, 41(3), 478–502. ISSN:00294624. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4494542

  • Feldbacher, C. J. (2012). Meta-induction and the wisdom of crowds. Comment on Paul D. Thorn and Gerhard Schurz. Analyse und Kritik, 34(2), 367–382. ISSN:0171-5860.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, R. (2007). Reasonable religious disagreements. In L. Antony (Ed.), Philosophers without god. Mediation on Atheism and secular life (pp. 194–214). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kittur, A. et al. (2007). Power of the few Vs. wisdom ofthe crowd: Wikipedia and the rise of the Bourgeoisie. Technival report, Alt.CHI at CHI 2007. alt.CHI at 25th Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI 2007), San Jose. http://www.viktoria.se/altchi/submissions/submission_edchi_1.pdf

  • Krogh, A., & Vedelsby, J. (1995). Neural network ensembles, cross validation, and active learning. In G. Tesauro, D. Touretzky, & T. Leen (Eds.), Advances in neural information processing systems (Vol. 7, pp. 231–238). Cambridge: MIT.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ladha, K. K. (1992). The condorcet jury theorem, free speech, and correlated votes. American Journal of Political Science, 36(3), 617–634. ISSN:00925853. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111584

  • List, C., & Goodin, R. E. (2001). Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the condorcet jury theorem. Journal of Political Philosophy, 9(3), 277–306. ISSN:1467-9760. doi:10.1111/1467–9760.00128.

    Google Scholar 

  • Page, S. E. (2007). The difference: How the power of diversity creates better groups, firms, schools, and societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stone, P. (2015). Introducing difference into the condorcet jury theorem. Theory and Decision, 78(3), 399–409. ISSN:0040-5833. doi:10.1007/s11238-014-9426-3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Surowiecki, J. (2005). The wisdom of crowds. New York: Anchor Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thorn, P., & Schurz, G. (2012). Meta-induction and the wisdom of crowds. Analyse und Kritik, 34(2), 339–366. ISSN:0171-5860.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zollman, K. J. S. (2015). Modeling the social consequences of testimonial norms. Philosophical Studies, 172(9), 2371–2383. ISSN:0031-8116. doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0416-7.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

For valuable discussion regarding this topic I’d like to thank especially Christoph Leitner, Gerhard Schurz, and Paul Thorn.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Christian J. Feldbacher .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Feldbacher, C.J. (2015). Is the Equal-Weight View Really Supported by Positive Crowd Effects?. In: Mäki, U., Votsis, I., Ruphy, S., Schurz, G. (eds) Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23015-3_7

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics