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Elliptic Curve Array Ballots for Homomorphic Tallying Elections

  • Maria dels Àngels CerveróEmail author
  • Víctor Mateu
  • Santi Martínez
  • Josep Maria Miret
  • Francesc Sebé
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9265)

Abstract

Remote voting systems implementing the homomorphic tallying paradigm have proven to be the best option for elections with a small range of candidates. In this paper, we propose a new homomorphic tallying remote voting system that makes use of elliptic curve cryptography. The proposed system is suitable for multiple choice elections. Detailed security and performance analysis are provided.

Keywords

Electronic voting Elliptic curve cryptography Homomorphic cryptosystem Security 

Notes

Acknowledgement

Research of the authors was supported in part by grants MTM2013-46949-P (Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación), 2014SGR-1666 (Generalitat de Catalunya) and IPT-2012-0603-430000 (Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maria dels Àngels Cerveró
    • 1
    Email author
  • Víctor Mateu
    • 1
    • 2
  • Santi Martínez
    • 1
  • Josep Maria Miret
    • 1
  • Francesc Sebé
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of MathematicsUniversitat de LleidaLleidaSpain
  2. 2.Scytl Secure Electronic VotingBarcelonaSpain

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