The Time of Experience and the Experience of Time

  • Valtteri ArstilaEmail author
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 9)


Philosophers have usually approached the concept of timing of experiences by addressing the question how the experiences of temporal phenomena can be explained. As a result, the issue of timing has been addressed in two different ways. The first, similar to the questions posed in sciences, concerns the relationship between the experienced time of events and the objective time of events. The second approach is more specific to philosophers’ debates, and concerns the phenomenology of experiences: how is the apparent temporal structure of experiences constituted? In regard to both questions, this article shows why and how philosophers’ views differ from those held by most scientists. To conclude, I present a combination of views that is not only compatible with that of scientists, but also addresses the problems that engage philosophers.


Timing of experiences Specious present Time consciousness Postdiction effects Brain time 



I am grateful for Christoph Hoerl, Dan Lloyd, Julian Kiverstein, Kielan Yarrow, and Marc Wittmann for stimulating discussions on these and related issues over the years. I want to thank also two anonymous referees for their thorough and helpful comments.


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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Behavioral Sciences and PhilosophyUniversity of TurkuTurkuFinland

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