The Time of Experience and the Experience of Time
Philosophers have usually approached the concept of timing of experiences by addressing the question how the experiences of temporal phenomena can be explained. As a result, the issue of timing has been addressed in two different ways. The first, similar to the questions posed in sciences, concerns the relationship between the experienced time of events and the objective time of events. The second approach is more specific to philosophers’ debates, and concerns the phenomenology of experiences: how is the apparent temporal structure of experiences constituted? In regard to both questions, this article shows why and how philosophers’ views differ from those held by most scientists. To conclude, I present a combination of views that is not only compatible with that of scientists, but also addresses the problems that engage philosophers.
KeywordsTiming of experiences Specious present Time consciousness Postdiction effects Brain time
I am grateful for Christoph Hoerl, Dan Lloyd, Julian Kiverstein, Kielan Yarrow, and Marc Wittmann for stimulating discussions on these and related issues over the years. I want to thank also two anonymous referees for their thorough and helpful comments.
- Arstila, Valtteri. 2015a. Defense of the brain time view. Frontiers of Psychology 6(1350). doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01350.
- Arstila, Valtteri. 2015b. Theories of apparent motion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. doi: 10.1007/s11097-015-9418-y.
- Arstila, Valtteri. Forthcoming. Keeping postdiction simple. Consciousness and Cognition.Google Scholar
- Block, Ned. 2007. Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30: 481–499; discussion 499–548.Google Scholar
- Broad, Charles Dunbar. 1938. An examination of McTaggart’s philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
- Dainton, Barry. 2010a. Temporal consciousness. In Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-temporal/. Accessed 14 June 2014.
- Dainton, Barry. 2010b. Temporal consciousness; Supplement: Interpreting temporal illusions. In Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-temporal/temporal-illusions.html. Accessed 14 June 2014.
- Dennett, Daniel. 1992. “Filling in” versus finding out: A ubiquitous confusion in cognitive science. In Cognition: Conceptual and methodological issues, ed. L. Herbert Jr., Paulus Willem van den Broek, and David C. Knill, 33–49. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Fonlupt, Pierre. 2003. Perception and judgement of physical causality involve different brain structures. Brain Research 17: 248–254.Google Scholar
- Grush, Rick. 2007. Time and experience. In Philosophie der Zeit, ed. Thomas Müller, 27–44. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.Google Scholar
- Hoerl, Christoph. 2015. Seeing motion and apparent motion. European Journal of Philosophy 23(3): 676–702. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00565.x.
- Lee, Geoffrey. 2014. Extensionalism, atomism, and continuity. In Debates in the metaphysics of time, ed. L. Nathan Oaklander, 149–173. London: Bloomsbury.Google Scholar
- Mölder, Bruno. 2014a. Constructing time: Dennett and Grush on temporal representation. In Subjective time: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality, ed. Valtteri Arstila and Dan Lloyd, 217–238. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- Phillips, Ian. 2014a. The temporal structure of experience. In Subjective time: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of temporality, ed. Valtteri Arstila and Dan Lloyd, 139–158. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar