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Our Concept of Time

  • Samuel BaronEmail author
  • Kristie Miller
Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind book series (SIBM, volume 9)

Abstract

In this chapter we argue that our concept of time is a functional concept. We argue that our concept of time is such that time is whatever it is that plays the time role, and we spell out what we take the time role to consist in. We evaluate this proposal against a number of other analyses of our concept of time, and argue that it better explains various features of our dispositions as speakers and our practices as agents.

Keywords

Concept Time Functional role Error theory Temporal phenomenology 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of HumanitiesUniversity of Western Australia CrawleyPerthAustralia
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyQuadrangle A14, University of SydneySydneyAustralia

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