Kant’s Antinomies Concerning the World Problem Starting from Cassirer-Heidegger’s Debate in Davos (1929)
The relationship between Imagination and Cosmos concerns immediately our Knowledge and its limits. The origins of our Knowledge involve the origins of our World, and we can recognize in such a question Transcendental Philosophy’s main theme. Indeed, this was a central question in the debate between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer in Davos, 1929. They discussed the role of Imagination in Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy, but they neglected to clarify the notion of “World,” essentially related to it. Nevertheless, if we read directly Antinomies concerning World in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, we do not find any answer, whereas we find a solution that puts Critical Philosophy in a state of crisis. We may observe in the core of Critical Philosophy the reduction of World problem to God problem, which becomes a sort of “code” of philosophical modern Idea of World, always subordinated to the other two main Ideas of metaphysical “Trinity,” as Löwith called it, God and Human.
KeywordsKant Heidegger World Imagination Einbildungskraft Antinomy
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