Abstract
The success probability of side-channel attacks depends on the used measurement techniques as well as the algorithmic processing to exploit available leakage. This is particularly critical in case of asymmetric cryptography, where attackers are only allowed single side-channel observations because secrets are either ephemeral or blinded by countermeasures. We focus on non-profiled attacks which require less attacker privileges and cannot be prevented easily. We significantly improve the algorithmic processing in non-profiled attacks based on clustering against exponentiation-based implementations compared to previous contributions. This improvement is mainly due to PCA and a strategy to select few mid-ranked components where exploitable, low-variance leakage is concentrated. As a result from a practical experiment using single-channel high-resolution magnetic field measurements, we report a significant improvement in the number of successful attacks. Further, we present the first practical results from using three such channels simultaneously. The combination of three channels leads to further improved results over the best individual channel when applying a profiled template attack. The clustering-based algorithmic approach for the non-profiled attack, however, does not show improvements from the combination.
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This work was partly funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research in the project SIBASE through grant number 01IS13020.
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A Appendix
A Appendix
1.1 A.1 Illustration of Principal Components After Transformation
Figure 4 depicts principal components after Principal Component Analysis (PCA) transformation for illustrative purposes. We used an example measurement where the side-channel leakage is sufficient for the attack to succeed without false classifications when selecting the \(k=4\)-th component for expectation maximization clustering. The topmost diagram depicts one trace-segment in its original form. Below this, the four highest-ranked principal components of this segment are depicted. From the previous analysis we know that the exploitable leakage seems concentrated in component \(k=4\) which is depicted in the bottom diagram. The time-samples with higher values represent the times of exploitable leakage information in this component. The sparse occurrence fits to the description of data-dependent register accesses as source of this leakage [9]. A comparison to the other components in Fig. 4 clearly shows that the leakage is small compared to the remaining signal parts.
1.2 A.2 Countermeasures
As previously described by Heyszl et al. [8], countermeasures such as exponent blinding do not protect against non-profiled attacks. Many countermeasures address individual single-execution leakage sources of implementation (e.g. address-bit, or localized leakage).
As a conclusion from this contribution, we must emphasize the necessity to reduce all possible single-execution leakage sources as much as possible.
Homma et al. [11] present a general countermeasure against high-resolution magnetic field measurements. They describe an on-chip sensor which detects magnetic field probes in close distance to die surfaces. However, in our opinion this will not help since measurement probes are typically placed close to an integrated circuit before power-up. Hence, necessary calibration routines of the sensor will likely not be able to distinguish the static probes from other environmental influences.
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Specht, R., Heyszl, J., Kleinsteuber, M., Sigl, G. (2015). Improving Non-profiled Attacks on Exponentiations Based on Clustering and Extracting Leakage from Multi-channel High-Resolution EM Measurements. In: Mangard, S., Poschmann, A. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9064. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21476-4_1
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