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Clinical View of Consciousness

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Brain and Mind
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Abstract

Consciousness changes with brain states, and as the brain is in a constant state of change, fluctuating between continuums of wakefulness–drowsiness–sleep cycles, one has to account for the many dimensions that consciousness takes.

The conscious brain must be constructed, the self, serving as the basis from which brain mechanisms lead to consciousness. Consciousness exists in a hierarchy of stages, each building upon and dependent on its predecessors. According to Damasio, the protoself is a nonconscious collection of representations of the multiple dimensions of the current state of the organism. Core consciousness arises when the brain generates a representation of the relationship between the organism (the self) and an environmental stimulus. The state following core consciousness is extended consciousness, the capacity to be aware of a large collection of entities and events and the ability to generate a sense of individual perspective or ownership. In agreement, Stern’s phases in the development of the sense of self map neatly into Damasio’s neuropsychological description. The emergent self that Stern describes is conceptualized by Damasio as the protoself. This brings an interesting parallel between the neural self and the psychoanalytical theories of self, which—as Freud himself believed—are rooted in biology.

We consider the very many altered states of consciousness that are part of a large behavioral repertoire of both physiological and pathological states of consciousness. For consciousness to exist, our brain must be capable of integrating information. Consciousness is lost when this is no longer possible, as in anesthesia, where there is a breakdown of connectivity and thus of integration of information. Studies that help us to better understand the most extreme states of impaired consciousness, persistent vegetative state, are discussed.

We describe a few clinical examples that demonstrate loss of awareness such as disconnection and neglect syndromes. The notion that consciousness can be fragmented is particularly apparent from the observation of patients with temporal lobe epilepsy in which patients may experience feelings of depersonalization together with multiple fragmentized sensory states. A loss of control of the normal boundaries between sleep and wake states results in a condition called narcolepsy. The memory impairment in Alzheimer’s disease eventually leads to a profound degradation of consciousness.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) is a clinical score to assess the level of consciousness in a patient. The GCS was originally described by two physicians from the University of Glasgow.

  2. 2.

    The discovery of the ARAS by Giuseppe Moruzzi and Horace Magoun dates back to 1949. They showed that stimulation of the brain stem reticular formation evoked an arousal reaction (Moruzzi and Magoun 1949).

  3. 3.

    The reversible unconsciousness of sleep relates to dynamic inhibition of the neurotransmitter systems involved in arousal. Sleep centers are mainly in the preoptic region of the hypothalamus and use γ-amino butyric acid (GABA), an inhibitory neurotransmitter. Adenosine, a neuromodulator, also provides feedback inhibition of the arousal system. For review, see Young (2009).

  4. 4.

    William James (1842–1910) is an American psychologist whose writings on emotions have inspired contemporary neuroscientists such as Damasio and LeDoux.

  5. 5.

    An unexpected finding that dates back to the introduction of fMRI in the early 1990s is the discovery of the brain default mode network (DMN) (Buckner 2012). The network is a set of brain regions that are tightly correlated and activated when an individual lies at rest in an imaging machine (fMRI). It contains parts of the medial and ventral temporal lobe, parietal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and cingulate cortex. This default brain network observed in fMRI corresponds to a state in which subjects are not accomplishing a task but are left in an idle state where they can dream or think about anything they like. This freewheeling mental activity involves a large portion of our brain, concerned with self-awareness, consciousness, and planning behavior. The DMN is also described in the previous chapter.

  6. 6.

    The term embodied mind, as seen previously, has been taken up by many neuroscientists and refers to how mind and body depend on each other.

  7. 7.

    The rich thalamocortical interconnectivity is central to the activity generating consciousness. As discussed previously, all models of consciousness refer to this system.

  8. 8.

    As seen previously, the DMN is composed of thalamocortical connections that include the medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, and the temporoparietal region.

  9. 9.

    The corpus callosum is a thick band of nerve fibers connecting the two hemispheres.

  10. 10.

    The left hemisphere is specialized for language and speech, while the right hemisphere is involved in such tasks as attention regulation and facial recognition.

  11. 11.

    Sacer, from Latin, means not only “holy,” “consecrated,” but also “wicked,” “horrible.”

  12. 12.

    Oliver Sacks (1933–2015) was a British-American neurologist who has written extensively about his experience with neurological patients. In his book Hallucinations (2012), he recounts hallucination narratives.

  13. 13.

    Wilder Penfield (1891–1976) was a Canadian neurosurgeon and neurophysiologist who worked at the Montreal Neurological Institute.

  14. 14.

    Narcolepsy is a rare disease affecting one in 2000 persons. The condition is described here because it offers a unique insight in the neurobiological mechanisms of regulation of sleep–wake cycles. Recent advances in the causes of narcolepsy may be relevant for a better understanding of other neurological and psychiatric disorders.

  15. 15.

    Constantin von Economo (1876–1931) was an Austrian psychiatrist and neurologist.

  16. 16.

    For example, several pediatric movement disorders have been linked to autoimmune derangements triggered by viral or bacterial infections, though the link remains controversial (Wolf and Singer 2008). There is also evidence supporting a role for an immune dysregulation in the development of psychosis spectrum disorders.

  17. 17.

    Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is the most common neurodegenerative disorder of the brain. The etiology of AD is still not well understood. For a discussion of the many factors, including genetic susceptibility traits responsible for this condition, the reader is referred to publications in specialized journals.

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© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Steck, A., Steck, B. (2016). Clinical View of Consciousness. In: Brain and Mind. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21287-6_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21287-6_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-21286-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-21287-6

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