An Extended Dependability Case to Share Responsibility Knowledge

  • T. Saruwatari
  • T. Hoshino
  • S. Yamamoto
Part of the Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies book series (SIST, volume 42)


Recently, critical incidents have occurred in complex Information Technology (IT) systems . Thus, how to confirm the dependability of a system using dependability cases is becoming necessary. Information related to dependability is important knowledge that must be shared among stakeholders. However, in the previous methods used to describe dependability cases, the relationship between a dependability claim and responsibility cannot be clearly specified. Thus, the cause investigation cannot be completed at the occurrence of the incident, since system knowledge could not fully be utilized. In this chapter, the d* framework is proposed to define the responsibility attributes for sharing knowledge and achieving agreements among stakeholders. The d* framework extends the dependability case to add an agent and an actor to the dependability case representing the responsibility attribute. A Meta model for the extended dependability case is also shown. Moreover, to show the effectiveness of the d* framework, three example applications are described.


Reliability Dependability case d* framework 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Graduate School of Information ScienceNagoya UniversityNagoyaJapan
  2. 2.Software Innovation Center NTTKonan, Minato-ku, TokyoJapan
  3. 3.Strategy Office, Information and Communications HeadquartersNagoya UniversityNagoyaJapan

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