Abstract
The chapter contributes to the debate about arguments by analogy, especially the distinction between ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ analogies and the question how such arguments can be ‘deductive’, yet nonetheless defeasible. It claims that ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ are structural, not normative categories, and should not be used to designate argument validity. Based on Aristotle’s analysis of enthymemes, examples, and metaphors, it argues that arguments from analogy are complex arguments that involve inductive, abductive, and deductive components.
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Notes
- 1.
An anonymous reviewer of this paper has challenged this analysis by raising objections to the view that deductive reasoning generally proceeds from universals to particulars, and inductive reasoning vice versa, maintaining that some deductive arguments go from particular to particular, and some inductive arguments from universal to universal or from particular to particular, invoking the following two examples: (1) This pen is red; red is a color; therefore this pen is colored (deductive argument that goes from particular to particular without involving a universal). (2) This tree has leaves; this next tree has leaves; […]; this next tree has leaves; therefore probably this next tree will have leaves (inductive argument from particular to particular). To these examples I would respond in the following way: In (1), for the sake of the argument, ‘red’ is assumed to be a particular, not a universal. Yet in my view, if ‘red’ is assumed to be a particular, the formulation of this example involves a category error: Taken literally, the argument would yield: This pen is red, red is a color; therefore this pen is a color (which is obviously false). Yet, if the premises are rearranged in the following way: All red things are colored; this pen is red; therefore this pen is colored, this is most clearly an inference from a universal (‘all red things’) to a particular (‘this pen’) (see also the interpretation of the same example as “grounded on a relation of semantic inclusion between these two predicates” by Macagno et al. 2014, p. 417). Example (2), on the other hand, is not a bare induction, but actually a perfect example of a complex argument by analogy (or by example, if you will), as analyzed below: From a number of trees that have leaves it is (inductively) inferred that probably all trees in a certain area have leaves; and since still another tree is (abductively) identified as being part of the trees in the same area, it is (deductively) inferred that it will also have leaves.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to express my thanks to Lilian Bermejo-Luque for kindly making accessible to me her unpublished work on arguments from analogy, and for many substantial discussions on that subject.
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Kraus, M. (2015). Arguments by Analogy (and What We Can Learn about Them from Aristotle). In: van Eemeren, F., Garssen, B. (eds) Reflections on Theoretical Issues in Argumentation Theory. Argumentation Library, vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21103-9_13
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