Abstract
Defenders of synthetic biology commonly make reference to the fact that established technologies, such as domestication or selective breeding, share some of the features of synthetic biology that critics argue make it ethically problematic. In this chapter, I reconstruct such references as instances of a type of argument which I dub the Continuity Argument. Roughly, the Continuity Argument seeks to show that if we are not disposed to reject the established technology, then features that this technology share with synthetic biology cannot provide reasons to find it ethically problematic. I assess the soundness of this argument and point out three problems with it: (1) That it fails to show that we should stop being critical of synthetic biology rather than start being critical of the established technologies; (2) that it does not take differences in degree into account; and (3) that it ignores the distinction between what reasons we have and what we should do all things considered. I then illustrate the Continuity Argument and its problems in the case where human manipulation of organisms’ genetic makeup is a suggested reason for finding synthetic biology problematic. Finally, I suggest ways in which references to established technologies can be used in a sound way in the ethical assessment of synthetic biology.
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- 1.
I use “being critical of” as a generic term covering any negative reactions to synthetic biology. I’ll return to this point below.
- 2.
I take this to be sufficiently close to the program of synthetic biology that I will not distinguish between synthetic biology and the creation of artificial organisms.
- 3.
As Douglas et al. recognize, the moral significance of artificial life might be positive, i.e. there might be moral reasons for creating artificial organisms. Since the main thrust of the debate about synthetic life has concerned whether it is negatively morally significant, Douglas et al. do not further discuss this possibility. For my purposes, given the fact that Continuity Arguments are typically defences against criticism of synthetic biology, it is mainly the (possible) negative moral significance that is at issue. But note that Continuity Arguments could be made with the opposite valence—i.e. arguments that dismissed a reason that was alleged to count in favour of synthetic biology (or another technology) by noting that the same reason would hold for a technology we were disposed to reject.
- 4.
This means that, in principle, Continuity Arguments could be made wherein the established technology is as new as, or even newer than, synthetic biology—although I am not aware of any such arguments.
- 5.
It should be noted, however, that the structure of reasons can be quite complex. Suppose that Chez Jacques is a three-star Michelin restaurant, while The Lean Pig is a run-of-the mill brasserie. In that case, the judgment that The Lean Pig is too expensive (i.e. that its expensiveness is a reason not to go) while Chez Jacques is not is intuitively quite plausible, even if they both cost the same (e.g. 200 €). One way of interpreting this is that the restaurants’ respective status provides reason for judging one (The Lean Pig) to be expensive, while the other was not (‘Chez Jacques is actually cheap for a three-star Michelin’, someone might say). So expensiveness becomes a property that is relative to the product. Alternatively, we might hold on to the idea that anything above 100 € is expensive, but then argue that the fact that Chez Jacques is a three-star restaurant defeats or attenuates the reason-giving force of expensiveness. Here, the different status of the restaurants provides reasons for thinking certain things about how other features they have—here, their expensiveness—count in favour of or against going.
- 6.
In other words, the boundary between blurriness and non-blurriness is not a blurry boundary.
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Christiansen, A. (2016). Synthetic Biology and the Argument from Continuity with Established Technologies. In: Hagen, K., Engelhard, M., Toepfer, G. (eds) Ambivalences of Creating Life. Ethics of Science and Technology Assessment, vol 45. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21088-9_16
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