Security & Privacy Implications

  • Benjamin Michéle
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Computer Science book series (BRIEFSCOMPUTER)


An insecure Smart TV ecosystem has implications for all of the involved parties: Consumers, content providers, vendors, and broadcasters. Implications include severe privacy and even safety issues for consumers, compromised DRM systems for content providers, as well as a lack of trust in vendors and broadcasters.


Content Provider Digital Right Management Digital Right Management System MITM Attack Default Gateway 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Security in TelecommunicationsTechnische Universität BerlinBerlinGermany

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