Abstract
In this paper, we present an historical and systematic overview of the study of the argumentum ad hominem since the seventeenth century. We discuss the main pre-Hamblin approaches (Locke, Whately, Schopenhauer, Perelman, Johnstone), the Standard Treatment (Hamblin, Copi, Rescher, Kahane), and recent post-Hamblin developments (formal dialectics, pragma-dialectics, Woods and Walton).
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Notes
- 1.
For the Aristotelian roots of the pejorative and the non-pejorative meanings of the term argumentum ad hominem, see Nuchelmans’s contribution to this volume. Cf. also the standard work on fallacies by Hamblin (1970).
- 2.
- 3.
Since Locke’s days, the list of ‘ad fallacies’ has grown considerably. Some well-known newcomers are ad baculum, ad consequentiam, ad misericordiam and ad populum. Hamblin mentions also a few less well-known new ‘ad-fallacies’ (1970, p. 41).
- 4.
Hamblin claims that Locke is referring to a Latin translation of a passage from De sophisticis elenchis by Aristotle and to several medieval treatises (1970, pp. 161–162). See also Nuchelmans’s contribution to this volume, which sheds more light on this question.
- 5.
Taken literally, ignoratio elenchi is ‘ignorance of refutation’. Aristotle speaks of this when, due to a lack of logical insight, someone does not understand that he has not proven what he is supposed to prove but, at best, has proven something entirely different. Only much later did the term come into vogue as a general designation for irrelevant conclusions (Hamblin 1970, p. 31).
- 6.
- 7.
The same view is also presented in Johnstone (1952).
- 8.
In our opinion, it is obvious that Johnstone’s outlook on argumentum ad hominem, like Perelman’s, is related to his rhetorical approach and the ideal of reasonableness that underlies it. Cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1991, Chapter 1).
- 9.
The distinction between argumentum ad hominem and argumentum ad personam is already made in Schopenhauer’s ‘Eristische Dialektik’ (p. 694).
- 10.
We owe these references to Hans Hansen (personal communication).
- 11.
Hamblin names six ‘recent’ textbooks that served as a basis for his characterization of the Standard Treatment (1970, p. 13). It is remarkable that, of these six books, only Copi (1972) and Cohen and Nagel (1934) mention the argumentum ad hominem. This is not the case in Black (1952 [1946]), Oesterlee (1952), Schipper and Schuh (1960) and Salmon (1963). Some introductory logic textbooks not mentioned by Hamblin in which the argumentum ad hominem is given a more or less Standard Treatment are Beardsley (1950), Fearnside and Holther (1959), Carney and Scheer (1964), Rescher (1964), Kahane (1973 [1969], 1976 [1971]), Michalos (1970), Gutenplan and Tamny (1971) and Purtill (1972).
- 12.
Copi borrowed this example from Whately (1826).
- 13.
Some authors do indeed treat the tu quoque as a separate fallacy. For example, Carney and Scheer (1964, pp. 31–36) and Kahane (1973, p. 236). For Kahane, the term tu quoque is another name for the fallacy ‘two wrongs make a right.’ Kahane does not make any further subdivision within the argumentum ad hominem. What he calls an argumentum ad hominem is the same as what Copi and Rescher call the abusive variant. Carney and Scheer treat the abusive variant and the circumstantial variant under the heading of argumentum ad hominem.
- 14.
It is extremely confusing that, under the title, ‘circumstantial,’ Copi does not only discuss cases which Rescher also calls ‘circumstantial’ but also cases which Rescher designates as ‘tu quoque’.
- 15.
- 16.
According to the Standard Treatment, in an argumentum ad ignorantiam it is concluded that something is the case because it is not proven that it is not the case—or, conversely, that something is not the case because it is not proven that it is the case (Copi 1972, p. 76). For Locke, the term argumentum ad ignorantiam refers to shifting the burden of proof: whoever casts doubt on an arguer’s standpoint must prove that this standpoint is false (cf. Hamblin 1970, pp. 160–62).
- 17.
This is sometimes due to the fact that there is no argument (as in many questions) and sometimes because the argument is not invalid at all (as in circular reasoning). In fact, only a few formal fallacies (such as affirming the consequent) fall under the definition without any problem.
- 18.
For an explanation of unexpressed premisses, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a, pp. 60–72).
- 19.
That is to say, not without taking the strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation to an unacceptable extreme. For a discussion of this strategy, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a, p. 49); for a discussion of the reconstruction of argumentative discourse, see van Eemeren et al. (1993, Chaps. 3 and 4).
- 20.
For a critical overview of these reactions see Grootendorst (1987).
- 21.
Copi states in his Preface to the fourth edition of Introduction to Logic (1972) that he made grateful use of Hamblin’s critical remarks in the chapter on fallacies; however, a closer comparison shows that aside from a few small alterations he adheres strictly to the Standard Treatment.
- 22.
Their reasons for both claims are not very strong but, for our present purposes, we will not delve further into this.
- 23.
- 24.
The subtitle of Barth and Martens’s article points directly to formal dialectics which Barth, along with Krabbe, was developing (Barth and Krabbe 1982). The term formal dialectics is borrowed from Hamblin (1970, pp. 253–282), but for Barth and Krabbe it does not have quite the same meaning. For a brief explanation of Lorenzen’s dialogical logic and Barth and Krabbe’s formal dialectics, see van Eemeren et al. (1987a, b, pp. 131–161).
- 25.
The same is true of Barth and Krabbe’s formal dialectics (1978, in Dutch; 1982, in English), in which none of the three variants of the argumentum ad hominem can be adequately analyzed. van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) argue that formal dialectics is quite removed from argumentation in ordinary discussions. In order to show this, they point to the crucial differences between the opponent’s concessions in a formal dialogue and the protagonist’s arguments in a critical discussion (1984, pp. 13–15).
- 26.
- 27.
Maintaining the term dialectics points to the similarity in overall objectives, replacing formal by pragma (from pragmatic) indicates the differences in orientation.
- 28.
It is assumed here that certain preliminary (or ‘higher order’) conditions are satisfied. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1988, pp. 287–288).
- 29.
Initially, it seemed that supplementing formal dialectics with so-called discussion-promoting ‘higher-order’ rules was sufficient to reach this objective (see Barth and Krabbe (1978) and van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1978)). Later, van Eemeren and Grootendorst chose a radically different approach which made it possible to analyze informal fallacies with the help of pragma-dialectical first-order rules (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1982/1984). For that matter, higher-order rales still play an important role in their approach (see Footnote 28) but not in the analysis of fallacies.
- 30.
- 31.
- 32.
- 33.
What Woods and Walton here call tu quoque is the circumstantial variant in the Standard treatment. Woods and Walton seem to more or less equate the two terms.
- 34.
In their textbook Argument: The Logic of the Fallacies, Woods and Walton give an identical analysis of the tu quoque (1982, pp. 11–13). Walton returns to this analysis in his subsequent works, although there ‘deontic-praxiological inconsistency’ is sometimes called ‘pragmatic inconsistency’ (1985, pp. 53–74, 1987a, b, pp. 222–227).
- 35.
- 36.
- 37.
- 38.
See, for instance, Govier (1982) on slippery slope, and Broyles (1975) on composition and division. Here again, a great many others could be mentioned. There are, however, also authors who deny the possibility of correct uses of the argumentum ad hominem. Cf., for instance, van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical approach (1992b) and Biro and Siegel’s epistemic approach (1992).
- 39.
Walton took the term ‘critical discussion’ from van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), who describe the purpose of a critical discussion as establishing ‘whether the protagonist’s standpoint is defensible against the critical reactions of the antagonist’ (1984, p. 17). In van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a) the purpose of a critical discussion is more accurately described as ‘reaching agreement about the acceptability or unacceptability of the standpoints at issue by finding out whether or not they can be adequately defended by means of argumentation against doubt or criticism’ (1992a, p. 34).
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Acknowledgment
We would like to thank Hans Hansen for his useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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van Eemeren, F.H., Grootendorst, R. (2015). The History of the Argumentum Ad Hominem Since the Seventeenth Century. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_32
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