Abstract
Some conspicuous characteristics of argumentation as we all know this phenomenon from our shared everyday experiences are in my view vital to its theoretical treatment because they should have methodological consequences for the way in which argumentation research is conducted. To start with, argumentation is in the first place a communicative act complex, which is realized by making functional verbal (and sometimes non-verbal) communicative moves.
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Notes
- 1.
In the past I used to speak of “verbal” or “linguistic” moves (e.g. van Eemeren et al. 1996, p. 2) , but because these moves can also be non-verbal, or partly non-verbal, I think it is better to refer to them more generally as “communicative” moves.
- 2.
In practice, this means that it is checked methodically by the parties involved whether or not the argumentative support given to the standpoints concerned justifies accepting them.
- 3.
In ordinary usage the scope of the word “reasonable” is not limited to verbal behavior but covers also non-verbal behavior. The scope of “reasonableness” seems to be wider than that of “rationality.” One can, for example, speak quite well of “reasonable desires” but not so easily of “rational desires.”
- 4.
Interpersonal does not necessarily mean collectivist. See Popper (1971, pp. 225–226).
- 5.
“Rational” often refers to egoistical behavior calculated exclusively to maximize the desired payoff, as when this term is used in economic models.
- 6.
This dual criterion was first proposed in Barth (1972).
- 7.
Following Popper, critical rationalists equate dialectical testing with the detection of contradictions and emphasize that the consequence of the fact that an assertive and its negation cannot both be acceptable at the same time is that one of the speech acts concerned must be withdrawn. In From Axiom to Dialogue, Barth and Krabbe (1982) propose methods designed to establish whether a certain standpoint (“thesis”) is tenable in relation to certain premises (“concessions”)—in other words, whether criticizing the standpoint, given these premises, leads to (a kind of) contradiction (or, more precisely, to the contrary dialogue attitudes: admitting that p and attacking p).
- 8.
Barth and Krabbe would probably call this semi-conventionality, since the company of discussants agrees only implicitly about the rules of discussion (1982, p. 22, 38ff.).
- 9.
The expression “ordinary arguers” refers in this case to people who are neither experts in the field of argumentation theory nor students who have received some specific training in argumentation analysis.
- 10.
One important proviso, however, is that this result was reached in experiments testing the subjects’ judgments in “neutralized” circumstances that abstracted from non-fulfillment of “higher order” conditions that might influence their compliance with reasonableness in argumentative reality.
- 11.
Some more clarity must be created, because Austin uses the term perlocutionary effect to refer to a waste basket covering the most disparate and dissimilar consequences of language use (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, p. 26).
- 12.
A rough-and-ready criterion for distinguishing between the performance of perlocutionary acts and the bringing about of unintended consequences is whether the speaker can reasonably be asked to provide his/her reasons for causing the consequence in question.
- 13.
It should be noted that “effectiveness” is not completely synonymous with “persuasiveness,” because aiming for effectiveness is not limited (as is the case with persuasiveness) to those parts of argumentative discourse (arguments) that can be reconstructed as belonging to the argumentation stage but applies also to the parts of the discourse that belong to the confrontation stage, the opening stage or the concluding stage, to which the term persuasiveness does not naturally pertain. One can speak of “persuasive arguments” in defense of prescriptive standpoints urging the addressee to do something or to refrain from doing something, but speaking of “persuasive arguments” in defense of descriptive standpoints is odd, just as speaking of “persuasive standpoints,” “persuasive doubts,” “persuasive starting points,” “persuasive conclusions,” etc. The term “convincingness” too applies only to parts of the discourse that can be reconstructed as arguments in the argumentation stage. Therefore, “reasonable plus effective equals convincing” cannot be used as a general characterization.
- 14.
It should be emphasized that the pursuit of effectiveness in reasonableness is not necessarily aimed at achieving effectiveness for the individuals who carry out the strategic maneuvering but may just as well be aimed at achieving effectiveness that is to the benefit of others whom they represent. As Jacobs (2002, p. 124) emphasizes,” “at the level of institutional functioning” “arguments may fulfill public interests.”
- 15.
Krabbe (2002, p. 35, note 13) thinks it necessary to distinguish between the goal of an activity and the aims of its participants once they are engaged in that activity: “Arguably, the primary goal of speeches, as a practice, is […] to resolve disputes, whereas the aim of the rhetor is to persuade the audience.” For certain purposes it may be useful to distinguish between these two objectives in this way when studying argumentative discourse in specific types of communicative activity, but for the purpose of illuminating the strategic maneuvering that takes place in every piece of argumentative discourse I find it more enlightening to assume that the arguer always has to combine pursuing at the same time the objectives of being reasonable and being effective.
- 16.
In our terminology, strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse refers to the efforts that are made in the discourse to move about between effectiveness and reasonableness in such a way that the balance—the equilibrium—between the two is maintained. An alternative term to “strategic” might be “tactical,” but the latter term highlights in the first place the local expediency of the maneuvering at the operational level and brings the terminology too close to the effectiveness pole while getting automatically too far removed from the reasonableness pole. I also think that in ordinary usage a “tactic” is in the first place a tool to reach a strategic goal, coming close to a ploy. In a more neutral fashion, I shall refer to tools used in maintaining the equilibrium between effectiveness and reasonableness as (argumentative) “techniques.”
- 17.
Within an empirical perspective “effectiveness” can be identified with the maximization of gain that represents one sense in which an actor is said to be “rational” (Goffman 1970, p. 86).
- 18.
A fundamental problem that threatens fallacy theory, in particular when each fallacy gets its own theoretical treatment, is that not only the treatments of the various fallacies are at variance with each other, but also the general perspectives from which these treatments start. Although in principle giving each fallacy its own treatment does not prevent the theorist from making all fallacy judgments from the same perspective (say a formal perspective as favored by Woods (1992) or an epistemological perspective as favored by Biro and Siegel (1992, 2006)), in practice often one perspective is used in one case and another in an other case, and different perspectives may even get mixed up. In such cases, ethical or moral considerations, for instance, all of a sudden get the upper hand over logical (or other) considerations relating to the perspective claimed to have been chosen. Wagemans (2003) provides a good illustration when he discusses Walton’s (1999) treatment of the argumentum ad ignorantiam. In his analysis, Walton introduces an epistemic norm to condemn such “arguments.” Next, however, he starts classifying exceptions to this norm, and mentions, instead of epistemic considerations, practical considerations relating to the consequences of applying the norm.
- 19.
Jacobs (2002, p. 122) correctly observes that “no list of categories will ever exhaustively enumerate all the ways in which argumentation can go wrong.”
- 20.
In this specific sense, the pragma-dialectical discussion rules “generate” new kinds of fallacies.
- 21.
Such a reconstruction in terms of a critical discussion should be theoretically justified and empirically faithful to the commitments that may be ascribed to the actors on the basis of their contributions. In order not to “over-interpret” the argumentative potential of the discourse, sensitivity must be maintained to the details of the presentation, the general rules for communication, and the contextual constraints inherent in the speech event concerned (van Eemeren et al. 1993, pp. 38–50).
- 22.
Walton and Krabbe (1995, p. 25) even speak of “blunders,” but I consider this term too strong for general use.
- 23.
Talking about the effectiveness of strategic maneuvering gives me the opportunity to remark that the optimal utilization of the opportunities for being effective will be an important topic at the next stage of the development of the pragma-dialectical research program. I agree with Jacobs that “to get beyond a categorical analysis of fallacies requires a refocus on the notion of argumentative effectiveness (Jacobs 1999, 2000)” (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, p. 123).
- 24.
In tackling the “demarcation problem” of how to distinguish in actual argumentative discourse between sound and fallacious moves I have proposed to view fallacious moves as derailments of strategic maneuvering in which a rule for critical discussion has been violated. This means in practice that the pursuit of rhetorical interests has gained the upper hand and the dialectical criteria pertaining to carrying out the mode of strategic maneuvering concerned have not been satisfied.This approach differs considerably from how the demarcation problem is dealt with by other argumentation theorists. On the one hand, there are argumentation theorists, such as Biro and Siegel (1992) and Johnson (2000), who give precedence to epistemological considerations and view fallacies as argumentative moves that obstruct in some way or other the search for the truth. On the other hand, there are rhetorically-minded theorists such as Willard (1995) and Leff (2000) who go primarily by empirical standards and view the fallacies in a more relativistic way as argumentative moves that are not accepted in a certain communicative community. Although in some cases the results of the theorizing may be virtually the same, these perspectives from which the fallacies are approached are fundamentally different from each other and from ours.
- 25.
All derailments of strategic maneuvering are fallacies in the sense that they violate one or more of the rules for critical discussion and all fallacies can be viewed as derailments of strategic maneuvering.
- 26.
Jacobs observes that “what makes for the difference between a tactic being obstructive or constructive is not the tactic per se, but the way in which the tactic in text functions in its context of use” (2002, p. 125).
- 27.
This is the more remarkable because when they are presented in clear cases these moves prove to be disapproved of. See van Eemeren et al. (2009, pp. 205–208).
- 28.
More confusing than the labeling, by the way, is the fact that, when characterizing fallacies, authors such as Walton (e.g. 1998) take as their starting point a certain argumentative phenomenon, say a personal attack, and call each argumentative move ad hominem in which this phenomenon occurs. Next they observe that these moves are not always fallacious and decide on an ad hoc basis whether or not a specific manifestation of ad hominem is fallacious. In contradistinction, in the pragma-dialectical approach fallacies are systematically viewed as violations of one or more rules for critical discussion that hinder the process of resolving a difference of opinion on the merits in a certain stage of the resolution process. In the case of an argumentum ad hominem fallacy, for instance, a violation is committed of the Freedom Rule by hindering the expression of a standpoint or doubt in the confrontation stage through a personal attack that prevents the other party from fulfilling his role in a critical discussion.
- 29.
In argumentative practice it may happen that one of the parties does not agree with appealing to an authority or with appealing to this particular authority because, for instance, this party is interested only in learning what the other party himself has to say on the matter (“Why do you refer to Professor Schama? You said yourself that this is such a beautiful painting and now I would like to hear what your arguments are for giving such a positive judgment”).
- 30.
Woods and Walton (1989, pp. 17–21) formulated, for instance, the following general “adequacy conditions” for the argument from authority: (1) “The authority must be interpreted correctly”; (2) “The authority must actually have special competence in an area and not simply glamour, prestige, or popularity”; (3) “The judgment of authority must actually be within the special field of competence”; (4) “Direct evidence must be available in principle”; (5) “A consensus technique is required for adjudicating disagreements among equally qualified authorities.”
- 31.
For the development of a pragma-dialectical view of an evaluative procedure and soundness conditions regarding strategic maneuvering with arguments from authority, see van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003).
- 32.
Because the general soundness criteria need to be applied in widely diverging macro-contexts in which different institutional needs must be satisfied, the exact meaning of the general criteria and the ways in which their fulfillment can be checked may vary. Who or what counts as an authority, for instance, will be different in a scientific debate than in a political interview.
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van Eemeren, F.H. (2015). Fallacies as Derailments of Argumentative Discourse Acceptance Based on Understanding and Critical Assessment. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_30
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