Abstract
According to Johnson (Argumentation & Rhetoric (CD-ROM). OSSA, St. Catherines, Ontario, 1998), to engage in the practice of argumentation is “to enter argumentative space.” The problem with this endeavor is that different theoreticians see this space in different ways. We, from our point of view, distinguish between two general meta-perspectives in the study of argumentation: a dialectical perspective focusing on critical debate, and a rhetorical perspective concentrating on the most appropriate means of persuasion in a certain context. This distinction, of course, corresponds with the well-known Aristotelian division.
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Notes
- 1.
We prefer to use the terms ‘tenability’ or ‘acceptability,’ to keep the basic theoretical apparatus free from epistemic associations. Surprisingly, coming from anti-relativists, Biro and Siegel claim that “an argument aims at, and a good one succeeds in, leading an inquirer or an audience from some proposition(s) whose truth or justifiedness they accept to others whose truth or justifiedness they will see themselves as having good reasons to accept on its basis” (1992, 92, our italics, vEH).
- 2.
Hamblin’s idea of a commitment-store, which is similar to Lorenzen’s set of concessions, and the accompanying commitment rules, are an invaluable addition to this way of theorizing: they make it possible to determine what each participant is committed to at each particular discussion stage. This is exactly the kind of externalization we are aiming for.
- 3.
Such a critical evaluation presupposes that ordinary arguers will, at least in principle, be inclined to comply with standards like those of a critical discussion (van Eemeren et al. 2000).
- 4.
Krabbe thinks that this might be a “dialectical obligation,” but in our opinion it typically represents a norm of a rhetorical nature that is implemented in a dialectical view of argumentative discourse.
- 5.
It is often wrongly assumed that audience adaptation is the overriding, if not the only, characteristic of rhetoric. Rhetoric is then without any further ado equalized with giving in to audience demand. There is also a tradition in which the use of presentational devices is taken to be the main characteristic of rhetoric. Rhetoric is then primarily viewed as stylistics. In fact, topical selection could just as well be seen as the general umbrella characteristic of rhetoric. In the latter case, rhetoric would be aptly described as the art of finding the appropriate loci of persuasion. In our view, none of these one-sided conceptions of rhetoric does justice to the intricate relationship inherent in any form of adequate strategic maneuvering.
- 6.
We agree with Rescher (1977) that it should always be possible to refer to a “common ground” that determines “what is to count as evidence.” We do not agree, however, that this common ground is necessarily “impartially fixed”: we leave it to the parties involved to choose their own point of departure.
- 7.
In his system for dealing with (mixed) disputes, Hamblin (1970, 274) also replaces the concept of burden of proof by the “somewhat simpler concept of initiative.”
- 8.
Barth and Krabbe (1982) take a similar approach.
- 9.
Whately already detected a presumtion in favor of existing institutions, “on the ground that since a change is not good in itself, he who demands a change should show a cause for it.” “If Bishop Whately were to revise his Elements of Rhetoric for a late twentieth-century audience,” Gaskins writes one and a half century later (1992: 45–46), “he would no doubt sadly inform us that, in public debate, the old presumption in favor of ‘every existing institution’ has now been shifted. The burden of proof no longer falls on ‘him who proposes an alteration,’ but rather on anyone who dares to suggest that existing institutions are doing their job. Whately’s conservative presumption, now blatantly reactionary, has been seriously challenged by its rhetorical counterpart: the increasingly radical presumption of institutional failure.” This explains why Goodnight (1980) feels there should be room for a ‘liberal presumption.’
- 10.
Although adopting a presumption clearly prejudges an issue, it may in Ullman-Margalit’s view be seen as rational in a twofold sense: in any particular instance the presumption is open to rebuttal, and the bias it promotes is independently justifiable. In pragma-dialectical terms, the former would mean that a starting point can be revoked; this, however, is only allowed when it can be shown by offering counter-evidence that this starting point is, after all, not acceptable. The latter would mean that institutional or other contextual support must be available.
- 11.
- 12.
In argumentative practice, too, the arguers’ orientation seems pragmatic rather than epistemological. Gaskins (1992, 25–26) observes that “for pragmatists truth is ‘the evolving product of a properly constituted research community’ and that, in a similar spirit, the authority and legitimacy of the (American) judicial process is based on the integrity of its procedures rather than any privileged access to truth.”.
- 13.
Walton and Krabbe (1995, 46) point at a favorable consequence of spelling out the rules of dialogue in the opening stage of the discussion: “Your commitment tends to be made more specific as well, for when precise rules of argument are spelled out, the means you can use to defend your point of view are narrowed down.”
- 14.
The critical questions systematically associated with the use of particular argument schemes agree to some extent with the Standard Objections distinguished by Henry Johnstone Jr, which refer to a class of objections “typically or frequently found in the neighbourhood of prominent issues,” but, due to their association with particular argument schemes, critical questions are more general and more systematic.
- 15.
As Krabbe (1999) emphasizes, it is “not the question whether one should enter some discussion at all. This is not to deny that one may feel obligated to respond […].”
- 16.
In this connection it is noteworthy that in law ‘inadmissible evidence’ does not automatically mean that a certain ‘fact’ is not correct but rather that the consequences that follow from this fact for the case at hand may not be drawn. Cf. Rescher (1977).
- 17.
This is, of course, Whately’s observation: “It may often be expedient to bring forward more proofs than can be fairly demanded of you. It is always desirable, when this is the case, that it should be known, and that the strength of the cause should be estimated accordingly” (1846, III, 2, part I/p. 112).
- 18.
Walton (1996) also identifies other specific techniques to disguise violations of the burden of proof rule: innuendo, say so, attribution, plausible denial of commitment, ambiguity, and other deceptive or confusing techniques.
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van Eemeren, F.H., Houtlosser, P. (2015). Strategic Maneuvering with the Burden of Proof. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_21
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