Strategic Maneuvering with the Burden of Proof

  • Frans H. van EemerenEmail author
  • Peter Houtlosser
Part of the Argumentation Library book series (ARGA, volume 27)


According to Johnson (Argumentation & Rhetoric (CD-ROM). OSSA, St. Catherines, Ontario, 1998), to engage in the practice of argumentation is “to enter argumentative space.” The problem with this endeavor is that different theoreticians see this space in different ways. We, from our point of view, distinguish between two general meta-perspectives in the study of argumentation: a dialectical perspective focusing on critical debate, and a rhetorical perspective concentrating on the most appropriate means of persuasion in a certain context. This distinction, of course, corresponds with the well-known Aristotelian division.


Critical Discussion Argument Scheme Argumentative Discourse Strategic Maneuvering Commitment Store 
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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, Faculty of HumanitiesUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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