Abstract
“Quirites!” This is the infamous one-word speech by which Julius Caesar won his rebellious legions over to fight the republican army in North Africa, in 46 BC. After having fought a great number of battles under Caesar’s command, the soldiers had refused to follow him again. Caesar’s use of the word quirites as form of address had a devastating effect. According to the classical scholar (Leeman in Argumentation illuminated. Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 12–22, 1992), ‘quirites’ was the dignified word a Roman magistrate used to address an assembly. Caesar’s use of this word to his soldiers made it clear to them that they had not only lost their privilege of being addressed as commilitones, or ‘comrades,’ but were even no longer entitled to a Roman general’s normal form of address for his soldiers: milites. “We are milites!” they reportedly shouted when they all volunteered to follow Caesar once more into battle. Ceasar’s use of the ‘neutral’ quirites as a qualification is an excellent illustration of how the communicative and interactional meaning of argumentative language use can only be grasped if the discourse is first put in a functional perspective in which its social context and the commitments assumed by the participants are duly taken into account.
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Notes
- 1.
For the principles of ‘functionalization,’ ‘socialization’ and ‘externalization’ involved in this approach, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 4–15).
- 2.
For the ‘dialectification’ of the study of argumentative discourse that is, in our view, required in this endeavor, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 14–18).
- 3.
Unlike in the ‘geometrical’ and ‘anthropological’ philosophies of argumentation distinguished by Toulmin (1976), argumentative discourse is thus inherently connected with conducting a ‘critical discussion,’ and reasonableness is neither reduced to instrumental rationality nor to achieving a cultural-determined mutual agreement. This critical philosophy of argumentation embodies a Popperian concept of reasonableness that does not restrict the possibility of arguing reasonably to a particular discipline say academic epistemology. Instead, in a critical rationalist vein, reasonable argumentation can occur in all spheres of life, inclusive of those in which value judgments may play a major part, such as political discourse and private deliberation.
- 4.
Unlike formal dialectics, pragma-dialectics is a discourse dialectic, closely aligned with a pragmatic approach to communication and interaction. This, however, does not automatically mean that formalization is right away excluded. Because pragma-dialectics involves the development of a model of regimented ways of resolving a difference of opinion, this approach to argumentation is formal in a procedural sense. Ultimately, it always depends on the stage of development a theoretical approach has reached what the possibilities for formalization are: in some instances formalization is premature and would spoil the view of the phenomena concerned while in other cases refraining from formalization prevents a theory from developing any further. In practice, it may be the case that the state of theorizing is such that only certain parts or aspects of the subject-matter are ready for formal treatment while others can only be formalized at the expense of harmful reductions.
- 5.
It is important to realize that in a critical discussion also standpoints can be ‘tested’ whose acceptability is not a matter of truth. Coherence in the sense of the avoidance of pragmatic inconsistency is then, of course, required. See Putnam (2001, 23).
- 6.
Although the quality of the pragma-dialectical rules depends on their problem-solving validity, the additional requirement of intersubjective validity creates a pressure to ascertain that people who aim to resolve their differences by means of argumentative discourse will maintain norms that are, at least for the most part, equivalent with the pragma-dialectical rules. To determine precisely to what extent the pragma-dialectical rules agree with the norms favored by ordinary language users, we test their intersubjective validity by carrying out a prolonged series of empirical investigations. The results provide a general insight into ordinary arguers’ reasonableness conceptions (see, e.g., van Eemeren et al. 2000). At the University of Amsterdam, we are also carrying out a research project aimed at making an inventory of all indicators of moves that are relevant to resolving a difference of opinion. The scope of the inventory extends to indicators of counterarguments, ‘argument schemes,’ and structural relations between arguments, and also to indicators of moves in other stages of the resolution process, such as expressing antagonism, granting a concession, and adding a rebuttal (see, e.g., Henkemans 1995).
- 7.
Toulmin calls such pragmatism “an honest foundation for knowledge” (2001, 174). This pragmatic approach is also important in distinguishing between ‘real’ and ‘artificial’ (or ‘academic’ or ‘philosophical’) doubt. The starting point for ‘real’ doubt lies in argumentative practice. Peirce once reminded us that having (real) doubt is not so easy as putting forward a lie. It is good to realize that ‘fallabilism’ does not mean that everything needs to be doubted, but only that doubt should be expressed if there is reason to express it. Putnam regards it as the most important insight achieved in American pragmatism that one can be ‘fallibilistic’ and ‘anti-skeptical’ at the same time (2001, 29–30).
- 8.
Among rhetoricians there is a confusing tendency to call such a pragmatic basis of argumentation or discussion rules ‘rhetorical.’ We prefer to reserve the term rhetorical for references to (clear and distinct concepts from) rhetorical theory. For a recent and serious attempt to connect rhetoric and pragmatics theoretically, see Dascal and Gross (1999), who acknowledge “that it is a union with problems on both sides of the aisle” (p. 108).
- 9.
It goes without saying that argumentative discourse, or any other kind of discourse, can also be analyzed from other perspectives, with other goals. As Kant already observed, the one analysis cannot necessarily be reduced to or translated into the other.
- 10.
- 11.
Linguistic pragmatics suggests already a strong argument for this approach: Why perform a speech act, in particular that of advancing a standpoint, if it is not for gaining acceptance?
- 12.
Using the label ‘rhetorical’ in this way does not necessarily imply a conception of rhetoric that equates rhetoric without any ado with ‘winning,’ let alone with ‘winning at all cost’ (or a similar goal). It does mean, however, that rhetoric, whatever safeguards are added, is in our view in the end always, and undeniably, associated with getting your point as intended across to the audience. According to Simons (1990), rhetoric is, most neutrally, the study and the practice of persuasion. Kienpointner (1995, 453) points out that many scholars see rhetoric as “a rather narrow subject dealing with the techniques of persuasion and/or stylistic devices,” but others conceive of rhetoric as “a general theory of argumentation and communication” (while still others deny that it is a discipline at all).
- 13.
We aim at integrating rhetorical insight into a dialectical framework, instead of the other way around, because our primary interest was and is the resolution of differences of opinion by putting standpoints to the (critical) test.
- 14.
In later years, a distinction can be made between philosophically oriented persuasion rhetoric, inspired by Aristotle and Whately, and elocutionary, decorative, belletristic rhetoric. As Gaonkar (1990) explains, in the United States there is also a tradition stemming from Burke that expands the frontiers of rhetoric from ‘persuasion’ to ‘identification’-as-an-explanation-for-social-cohesion. According to van Eemeren et al. (1997, 213), modern-day persuasion theories are “heavily oriented to analysis of attitude formation and change” and bear little resemblance to Aristotle’s rhetoric.
- 15.
According to Mack, with the foundation of the universities, from the thirteenth century onward dialectic became the “intellectually dominant part of the trivium, while rhetoric was left with the important practical task of teaching official letter-writing” (1993, 8).
- 16.
Although the nature, speed and coherence of this ‘Scientific Revolution’ are questioned in recent studies in the history of science, such as Shapin (1996), Toulmin’s general observation still stands, albeit more so in its subtler version expounded in Toulmin (2001) than in the cruder version Toulmin put forward in his Jefferson Lecture of 1997, where he identified the Peace of Westphalia (1648) as the breaking point.
- 17.
According to Toulmin, rhetoric was until recently by many logicians seen as no more than “the deceptive peddling of falsehoods” (2001, 12).
- 18.
A similar development has taken place in the history of juridical theorizing. See Hohmann, this volume.
- 19.
Among the dialectical theories of argumentation with a formal character, apart from Barth and Krabbe (1982), are Hamblin (1970), Rescher (1977) and Woods and Walton’s joint studies of the fallacies (1989). Influential modern rhetorical approaches are Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1969) ‘new rhetoric’ and some traditions in American speech communication (see van Eemeren et al. 1996, Chap. 7).
- 20.
Reboul (1991, 46) observes that for antistrophos the translators “donnent […] tantôt ‘analogue,’ tantôt ‘contrepartie.’” He adds: “Antistrophos: il est gênant qu’un livre commence avec un terme aussi obscur!”
- 21.
Mack explains that Agricola’s work is unlike any previous rhetoric or dialectic: “[He] has selected materials from the traditional contents of both subjects” (1993, 122). In Meerhoff’s (1988, 273) view, “pour Agricola, […] loin de réduire la dialectique à la seule recherche de la vérité rationelle, il entend parler de celle-ci en termes de communication.”
- 22.
We agree with Toulmin: “If we accept a pragmatic view of theorizing [such as Dewey’s], it is not hard to escape from the imbalance in our ideals about Reason that we have inherited from Modernity” (2001, 172).
- 23.
- 24.
- 25.
A party that utilizes the material available in the context concerned in the most expedient way, taking carefully into account the beliefs, preferences and expectations of the other party or audience, and verbalizing its contributions in the most appropriate way, can be said to optimally adjust (to) the situation at hand (cf. Jacobs, this volume).
- 26.
In the way we use the term, there are aggregates of topical potential or ‘topical systems’ for all discussion stages, not just for the argumentation stage.
- 27.
‘Presence’ can, of course, also be accomplished by non-verbal means, such as pictures and tables. See Groarke (2002).
- 28.
- 29.
For the notion of ‘disagreement space,’ see van Eemeren et al. (1993, 95).
- 30.
According to Dascal and Gross “style is both a level at which discourse is pitched ([…] a register) and a set of semantic, syntactic, and prosodic variants within that register” (1999, 122). We agree, but would like to add a pragmatic element to the second meaning.
- 31.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca regard a rhetorical figure as “a discernible structure, independent of the content, […] a form (which may […] be syntactic, semantic or pragmatic) and a use that is different from the normal manner of expression, and, consequently, attracts attention” (1969, 168).
- 32.
“If the argumentative role of figures is disregarded, their study will,” in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s opinion, “soon seem to be a useless [or literary] pastime” (1969, 167).
- 33.
It is often wrongly assumed that audience adaptation is the overriding, if not the only, characteristic of rhetoric. Rhetoric is then without any further ado equalized with giving in to audience demand. There is also a tradition in which the use of presentational devices is taken to be the main characteristic of rhetoric. Rhetoric is then primarily viewed as stylistics. In fact, topical selection could just as well be seen as the general umbrella characteristic of rhetoric. In the latter case, rhetoric would be aptly described as the art of finding the appropriate loci of persuasion. In our view, none of these one-sided conceptions of rhetoric does justice to the intricate relationship inherent in any form of adequate strategic maneuvering.
- 34.
This characterization can thus be of help in explaining the deceptive character of the fallacies.
- 35.
- 36.
When two parties have contradictory standpoints, the dispute is mixed. When one party has a standpoint and the other party is neutral in the sense that it questions the standpoint but has no standpoint of its own, the dispute is non-mixed (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 16–22).
- 37.
Additional conditions are that the proposition concerned is really part of the opponent’s commiments and that the proponent himself is prepared to live up to the commitments involved.
- 38.
There were cries for intervention after Ken Saro-Wiwa had been sentenced to death and had not yet been executed, but no such cries were heard after the execution, i.e., at the time when Shell published its advertorial. By then, the only demand was that Shell should get out of Nigeria.
- 39.
See for the distinction between analytic and evaluative relevance van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992).
- 40.
Even for the standpoint that Shell should not intervene, this argument offers only very weak support, but because this explicit standpoint is much less controversial than the implicit standpoint, this support might suffice.
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van Eemeren, F.H., Houtlosser, P. (2015). Strategic Maneuvering: Maintaining a Delicate Balance. In: Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse. Argumentation Library, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20955-5_18
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