Abstract
If concept-swapping is a fallacy consisting in arguing in favour of a synthetic statement disguised as an analytic one, then there is nothing more important for philosophical methodology than to have a firm and clear grasp of the analytic-synthetic distinction. A useful byproduct of this would be that we will be in a position to understand why serious scholars spend so much time arguing about definitions, thereby treating terminological questions as though they were substantive. Although this strange phenomenon can be observed in all areas of philosophy nowhere is there more at stake as when concept-swapping is taken to decide questions of law.
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Notes
- 1.
The background for this story is a German esoteric movement called ‘anthroposophy’, whose leading spirit was Rudolf Steiner, a publicist and social and educational reformer very active at the beginning of the twentieth century. In the Anthroposophical Conference Nelson alludes to (‘Cultural Perspectives of the Anthroposophic Movement’, Stuttgart, from 28 August through 7 September 1921), a certain Dr. Carl Unger was supposed to talk about ‘The Autonomy of Philosophical Consciousness and Nelson’s Neo-Friesianism’. In the obscure journal mentioned by Nelson a certain Walter Johannes Stein had reviewed Kerler (1921). As a curious aside, this book by Kerler also contains a criticism of Nelson.
- 2.
Stein (1921, 3; it is a quotation of Steiner 1894, Chap. IV). The reader who finds all this rather quaint and dated is kindly reminded that quite similar arguments have been, and are still being, offered both by philosophers (e.g. by Heidegger and his followers) and social scientists (e.g. by a certain brand of Durkheimians). In fact, even certain analytic philosophers fond of cognitive externalism occasionally surf these waters.
- 3.
See Stein (1921, 3).
- 4.
The word ‘surrendering’ (with its quasi-military connotations) very imperfectly translates German Hingebung, whose main connotations are (a) dedication to a cause, (b) unconditional love, (c) yielding to one’s partner during the sexual act.
- 5.
The three passages quoted are, respectively, on pages 576, 577 and 578 of Stammler (1902).
- 6.
The whole question of sovereignty, which occupied and still occupies pride of place in political philosophy, is treated extensively in Nelson (1917).
References
Kerler, Dietrich Heinrich. 1921. Die auferstandene Metaphysik: eine Abrechnung [Metaphysics resurrected: A settling of scores]. Ulm: Verlag von Heinrich Kerler.
Nelson, Leonard. 1917. Die Rechtswissenschaft ohne Recht: kritische Betrachtungen über die Grundlagen des Staats- und Völkerrechts, insbesondere über die Lehre von der Souveranität [Law without justice: Critical reflections on the foundations of public and international law, in particular on the theory of sovereignty]. Leipzig: Veit & Comp [Reprinted in Nelson (1971–1977), vol. IX, 123–324].
Nelson, Leonard. 1971–1977. Gesammelte Schriften, 9 vols. eds. Paul Bernays, Willy Eichler, Arnold Gysin, Gustav Heckmann, Grete Henry-Hermann, Fritz von Hippel, Stephan Körner, Werner Kroebel, and Gerhard Weisser. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
Stammler, Rudolf. 1902. Die Lehre von dem richtigen Rechte. Berlin: J. Guttentag. [English translation: The theory of justice. New York: Macmillan (1925)].
Stein, Walter Johannes. 1921. Zur Verteidigung der ‘Philosophie der Freiheit’ [In defense of the ‘philosophy of freedom’]. Dreigliederung des sozialen Organismus 3: 2–3.
Steiner, Rudolf. 1894. Die Philosophie der Freiheit: Grundzüge einer modernen Weltanschauung. Berlin: Emil Ferber. [English translation: Philosophy of freedom: A modern philosophy of life developed by scientific methods. London: G.P. Putnam’s Sons (1916)].
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Nelson, L. (2016). Lecture XV. In: A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies. Argumentation Library, vol 26. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20783-4_16
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