Inquiry and Justification
Traditionally, inquiry and justification have been treated as two distinct phenomena that are largely independent of each other. Seeing both as interrogative processes can help to see how they are connected. Inquiry is seen as such in Hintikka’s model of interrogative inquiry, and justification is seen as such in the dialectical account of justification. It is argued that processes of inquiry and justification are not independent of each other: On the one hand, successfully carrying out processes of inquiry may require engaging in processes of justification. On the other hand, processes of justification may require engaging in processes of inquiry. Production of scientific knowledge requires both types of processes.
KeywordsInterrogative inquiry Epistemic justification Dialectical justification Scientific knowledge
The comments of two anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged. Part of the work was carried out while working at the University of Helsinki under a grant (number 1251076) from the Academy of Finland.
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